



WWJMRD 2017; 3(8): 227-224

www.wwjmr.com

International Journal

Peer Reviewed Journal

Refereed Journal

Indexed Journal

UGC Approved Journal

Impact Factor MJIF: 4.25

e-ISSN: 2454-6615

Valentine Belfiglio

Ph.D, professor of government
at the Texas Woman's
University, Denton, Texas

Discordibus culturis in antiquitate

Valentine Belfiglio

Abstract

This article explores the clash of four empires and one republic in antiquity. The work attempts to show that microcosmic and macrocosmic factors other than civilizational differences are the causes of conflicts between Western Europe and North Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia. Micro factors include egotism, ideological differences, revenge, and sometimes personality disorders. Macro factors include the quest for and maintenance of valuable land and sea territories. The evolution of two major religions, Christianity and Islam changed the dynamics of territorial conflicts between countries or empires in the West and East by intensifying territorial disputes. Soldiers and suicide-bombers are pawns in wars which leaders seek to expand or retain territory. However, the aforementioned microcosmic and macrocosmic factors have remained the same in ancient and modern times.

Keywords: territorial imperative, civilizations, military imperialism, ideologies

Introduction

The main purpose of this article is to show that the conflict between Western Civilization and Islamic Civilization as defined by Samuel P. Huntington has little to do with Christianity and Islam. Huntington writes: "Religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations."¹ The key question that the author is addressing is what are the major factors that actually cause a conflict between the countries of Western Civilization and the nations of Southwest Asia and North Africa? This article explores the clash of four empires and one republic in antiquity. The most important information in this article is the titanic struggles that took place between European empires and the empires of Southwest Asia and North Africa before the birth of Christ (A.D. 1) and Mohammed (A.D.570).

Conceptual Model and Analytical Framework

The main assumption in this article is that microcosmic and macrocosmic factors other than civilizational differences, including religion, are the main causes of international conflicts. Microcosmic factors include personality and mood disorders and differences in the values and beliefs of authoritarian political leaders, including dominance status, antisocial personality disorders, psychopathy, egotism and revenge. Writers from several disciplines have identified microcosmic factors include stress, anxiety, hatred, ethnocentrism and xenophobia on personal, the prevailing part of group behavior and national leaders.² Other factors include competition for resources such as fertile lands or lands with strategic minerals or precious gems, control of vital sea lanes or natural harbors and ports, and coastal areas abundant in seafood. Popular nationalism and jingoism are also factors. The key idea we need to understand in this article is that economic gain, issues of national security, and national prestige are much more important factors than religion as causative factors for international conflict and war. The main assumptions underlying the author's thinking is that victorious war, lost war, and the existence of weak states or unoccupied territories are factors which can lead to military imperialism.

Correspondence:

Valentine Belfiglio

Ph.D, professor of government
at the Texas Woman's
University, Denton, Texas

¹ Huntington, Samuel P., the Clash of Civilizations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 45-47.

² Edwards, George C., Presidential Leadership (Belmont, CA. Wadsworth. 2006), 256-275.; Darley, John M. Psychology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 317-320; Broom, Leonard, Sociology, (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth, 1990), 86-87.

If we take this line of reasoning seriously, the causes and prevention of warfare can be more easily identified and addressed. If we fail to take this line of reasoning seriously, the causes and prevention of warfare cannot be more easily identified and the conflict between Western and Islamic Civilizations could escalate. Huntington defines civilization as: “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people.” The portrayal of conflict in the modern world as a clash of six or seven civilizations is a magnificent illusion created by Huntington. This paper contains two theses. The first microcosmic thesis is that the predominant motives of imperialistic leaders are revenge and egotism. The second macrocosmic thesis is that the predominant motive of imperialistic political systems is control or predominant influence over valuable territories. By increasing the territories controlled by a state it increased the available wealth available to the leaders and citizens of that state. This paper is proposing a new a different way of approaching the interpretation of historical events. Warfare in the future will not be predominantly caused by civilizational conflicts, but between nation states and non-state actors in the form of terrorist organizations for territorial dominance.

Review of the Literature

Herodotus, *The Histories*, translated by G.C. Macaulay (New York: Barnes & Noble, 2004). Arrian, *Anabasis Alexandrou*, translated by Pamela Mensch (New York: Anchor Books, 2012). Livy, *History of Rome*, translated by B.O. Foster, E.T. Sage, and A.C. Schlesinger, Books 21-30 (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1919-1957). Polybius, *The Histories of Polybius*, translated by W.R. Paton, (London: William Heinemann, 1922) Volumes 1-6. Appian, *The Foreign Wars*, translated by Horace White, (San Bernardino, California, 2016). Plutarch, *The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans*, translated by Bernadotte Perrin, (London: William Heinemann, 1928), Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, *The Twelve Caesars*, translated by Robert Graves, (New York: Penguin Books, 1979). Dio Cassius Cocceianus, *Roman History*, translated by Earnest Cary, (London: William Heinemann, 1954). The secondary sources selected for this study are those books and articles which are well researched, well written, well organized, and, most important, well documented. Without documentation it is impossible to check the authenticity of what an author has written, no matter how eloquent the writing. Two excellent books about the Punic Wars are: Adrian Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars* (London: Cassell & Co., 2000), and Richard Miles, *Carthage Must Be Destroyed* (New York: Viking, 2010). For the Persian Wars, consult Sarah B. Pomeroy, (et. al), *A Brief History of Ancient Greece* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004): 110-137).

Methodology

This article explores the clash of four empires and one republic. The first clash was between the Greek Kingdom of Macedon (808-168 B.C.), and the Archaemenid Empire (550-330 B.C.) The second clash was between the Roman

Republic (509-27 B.C.), and the Carthaginian Empire (814-146 B.C.), and the third clash was between the Roman Republic and the Parthian Empire (247 B.C.-A.D. 224). All of these empires and the Roman Republic meet the criteria of the definition of civilization established by Huntington. The research design of this study employs a combination of historiography and neorealism. Historiography is an approach based on the concept that historical knowledge provides the basis of and rationale for valid knowledge about human activities and achievements. Neorealism proposes that structural constraints and the semi-anarchic nature of the international political system influence the behavior of world leaders.³ The conceptual model of this work was developed by the author and strongly influenced by the works of Robert Ardrey and Sinisa Malesevic.⁴ The model appears in the appendix.

The Greco-Persian Wars

Samuel Huntington places Greece and Rome within the parameter of Western Civilization and its potential rival as Islamic Civilization. The Greco-Persian Wars (499 B.C.-449 B.C.) occurred long before the birth of Christ or Muhammad. The wars were a series of conflicts between the Achaemenid Empire of Persia (modern Iran) and the Greek city-states. The Achaemenid Empire, established by King Cyrus II (576-530 B.C.), included several nations, spanning at its maximum extent from the Balkans to the Indus Valley. In order to gain access to the Aegean Sea, the Persians annexed Ionia in 545 B.C., and conquered Thrace and Macedonia in 514 B.C. to bring the northern coast of the Aegean under Persian control.⁵

An unsuccessful revolt by the Ionian cities in 499 B.C., assisted by the Athenian navy, led Darius to seek revenge by attacking mainland Greece. In 490 B.C. a Persian fleet of 600 ships landed an army of 48,000 soldiers on the plain of Marathon.⁶ However, 10,000 Greek hoplite soldiers, aided by 2,000 warriors from Plataea, attacked and crushed the Persian forces. The hoplites were heavily armed foot soldiers that fought in close formation, usually in ranks of eight men. This tactic, called a phalanx, was a highly effective military maneuver. The Persians suffered a loss of 6,400 men, and only 192 Athenian forces died in the battle.⁷ King Darius died in 486 B.C. and the Persian Empire came under the control of King Xerxes I (520 -465 B.C.).

Xerxes decided to launch an offensive sea-ground task force operation against the Greek city-states. He prepared a military force of 5,283,220 men,⁸ including 80,000 cavalry,

³ Waltz, Kenneth, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading MA.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 5-41.

⁴ Ardrey, Robert, *The territorial Imperative* (Lexington, KY: Atheneum, 1966); Malesevic, Sinisa, *The Sociology of War and Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Barnard, Alan, *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology*, (London: Routledge, 1996), 559-560; Morgenthau, Hans, *Politics Among Nations*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 5, 58-59, 497-499.

⁵ Herodotus, *The Histories*, 1.141, 5.14-16, 6.45.

⁶ Herodotus, *The Histories*, 6.94-95; 102-117, Cornelius Nepos, *Miltiades, Epitome of Roman History*, (London: William Heinemann, 1929), 4-5. Dupuy, R.E. and Dupuy, T.N., *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 27-28.

⁷ Herodotus, *The Histories*, 6.110-117.

⁸ Herodotus, *The Histories*, 7.186, 7.87, 89.

and 1,207 ships.⁹ However, because of logistical and geopolitical factors, it was only possible to transport and engage no more than 300,000 troops in the conflict.¹⁰ Herodotus, (484-425 B.C.) outlines two reasons for the invasion. The first reason was revenge for the lost war at Marathon. Herodotus mentions “vengeance and retribution.”¹¹ The second reason was to launch an invasion of European territory after annexing Greece into the Persian Empire. Herodotus wrote: “all Europe might be brought over to him, city by city and nation by nation, the inhabitants being either conquered or surrendering on terms before they were conquered.”¹²

To confront this massive invasion some of the Greek states formed a defensive league under Spartan leadership. The total Greek force was 110,000 infantry and 200 trireme ships.¹³ The army of Xerxes gathered in Sardis in modern Turkey. Persian engineers built a pontoon bridge across the Dardanelles by tying ships together with ropes. On 480 B.C. the land and sea invasion of Greece began. The Persians overwhelmed a small garrison at Thermopylae. The Persians then occupied Athens in 480 B.C. Later that year the Persians suffered a great loss at the naval battle of Salamis. Half of the Persian fleet was sunk or captured, but the Greeks lost only 40 ships. The Greek admiral Themistocles (524-459) lured the Persian fleet into the Straits of Salamis, where the Greek ships had greater maneuverability over the Persian vessels.¹⁴ The decisive battle of the war took place on land at Plataea in 479 B.C. Xerxes planned to overwhelm the Greeks with superior numbers. He apparently did not understand the iron discipline and training of the Spartan hoplite. These soldiers were heavily armored and expert with killing enemies with swords, spears and shields. He also underestimated the technical military superiority of the Greek phalanx. The Persians lost over 50,000 soldiers while 1,360 Greeks died in the conflict.¹⁵ The remaining battles after Plataea involved the destruction of remaining Persian resistance on land and sea. The Peace Treaty of Callias in 448 B.C. brought the Greco-Persian War to an end.

Summative Analysis: Microcosmic causes of the Greco-Persian War were the revenge of Xerxes for the lost war at Marathon, and the fear of General Pausanias other Greek leaders and citizens of Persian Domination of the Greek city-states. Macrocosmic reasons for the war were Xerxes desire to conquer Greece, and use that land as a base of operations to control lands bordering the Mediterranean Sea, and efforts by the Greek city-states to collectively maintain their sovereignty.

The Punic Wars

The Punic Wars were a series of contests between the Roman Republic (509-27 B.C) and the Carthaginian Empire (264 B.C.-146 B.C.) for control of the Mediterranean Sea and the lands around it. Samuel Huntington places modern North Africa within the parameter of Islamic Civilization and Italy within the

parameter of Western Civilization. Carthage was one of the greatest cities of ancient times. By 265 B.C. the legions of the Roman Republic virtually conquered the entire Italian peninsula, except for the Celts.¹⁶ The Consuls and Senate of Rome embraced a policy of imperialism. The Greek historian Polybius (200-118 B.C.) wrote: “the Romans had from the outset sufficient reason to entertain the design of creating a world empire and sufficient resources to accomplish their purpose.”¹⁷ The next logical step was the island of Sicily.

Sicily is an island of about 10,000 square miles located in the center of the Mediterranean Sea. It lies about 100 miles northeast of ancient Carthage and between two and ten miles from the Italian mainland. East-west sea trade along the Mediterranean must pass close to the island. The soil was fertile, suitable for farming and as an island convenient for fishing. Sulfur and lead were abundant on the island. Unfortunately for the Romans the Carthaginian Empire had a formidable navy and controlled western and central Sicily, North Africa, southern Spain, Corsica and southern Sardinia.¹⁸ If, as Polybius wrote the grand strategy of the Roman Republic was a world empire, the immediate objective in 264 B.C. was “the possession of Sicily.”¹⁹

The Roman Republic faced a problem. Carthage had a formidable navy of warships, and Rome had no navy to match it. Using a Carthaginian vessel as a model, they quickly built 120 battleships.²⁰ The Romans introduced two major modifications in their ships. The first modification was the corvus. The corvus was a combined grappling device and gangway. It was a narrow bridge four feet wide and 36 feet long made of planks. The Romans fastened an iron spike at one of the gangway. When an enemy ship passed close to a Roman vessel, Roman sailors grappled the enemy ship and held it in place with the iron spike. A swarm of legionnaires dashed across the gangway to turn a naval battle into close combat on the deck of the enemy ship. The second modification was turrets fore and aft on the Roman ships. The Romans used the turrets to allow legionnaires to hurl missiles at the sailors of the enemy ship and discourage counter boarding by the enemy.²¹

The First Punic War (264-241 B.C.) was fought on land and sea. The decisive battle of the war was fought off the Aegates islands in 241 B.C. A Roman fleet of 200 ships under the command of Gaius Lutatius confronted a Carthaginian fleet of 200 vessels under the command of Hanno. Lutatius won a great victory, sinking 50 Carthaginian warships and capturing 70 others. Roman troops captured ten thousand Carthaginian prisoners.²² The peace treaty that followed allowed Roman control over western Sicily and required Carthage to pay an indemnity of 3,200 silver talents over ten years.²³

Summative Analysis: Microcosmic causes of the First Punic War were the egotism of the Roman Consuls Claudius Caudex and Fulvius Flaccus (264 B.C.) in their desire for Roman expansionism. A second microcosmic reason for the war was the Carthaginian General and

⁹ Herodotus, *The Histories*, 7.89.

¹⁰ Herodotus, 9.70

¹¹ Herodotus, *The Histories*, 7.7.

¹² Herodotus, *The Histories*, 8.108, 7.5.-8.

¹³ Herodotus, *The Histories*, 9.29.7.144.

¹⁴ Herodotus, *The Histories*, 7.175-177, 8.43-95.

¹⁵ Herodotus, *The Histories*, 9.90-104.

¹⁶ Polybius, *The Histories of Polybius*, 1.6.

¹⁷ Polybius, *The Histories of Polybius*, 1.3.

¹⁸ Polybius, *The Histories of Polybius*, 1.8-1.10.

¹⁹ Polybius, *The Histories of Polybius*, 1.13.

²⁰ Polybius, *The Histories of Polybius*, 1.20.

²¹ Polybius, *The Histories of Polybius*, 1.22.

²² Polybius, *The Histories of Polybius*, 1.59-61.

²³ Polybius, *The Histories of Polybius*, 1.62.

Statesman, Hamilcar Barca, feared the loss of Sicily and dominance of sea trade in the western Mediterranean Sea. Macrocosmic reasons for the war were control of Sicily and the Strait of Messina.

Rome annexed Sardinia and Corsica in 238 B.C. Sardinia contained important minerals, including lead and iron. This seizure and the embarrassment of losing the first Punic War infuriated Hamilcar Barca and his son Hannibal. Hamilcar Barca Seized southern Spain in 228 B.C. before his death there in 228 B.C. Spain (Iberia) was a treasure trove of strategic minerals. It contained gold, silver, copper, tin, lead and iron, Hannibal would raise a great army and challenge Roman supremacy in the Mediterranean basin. Hannibal set out with a total force of 90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry and 21 elephants.²⁴ The Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.) began. Because Rome controlled the sea, Hannibal marched overland, crossed the Pyrenees and Alps mountains to attack Rome from the north. After the treacherous journey Hannibal arrived in the Po Valley with an infantry of between 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry and a few elephants.²⁵ Hannibal's army was reinforced with warriors from Gallic tribes. In response, The Roman Senate issued a decree providing for 24,000 legionnaires, 1,800 cavalry, and auxiliary forces of 40,000 infantry and 4,400 cavalry. The Roman fleet consisted of 220 warships and 28 light craft.²⁶

Hannibal Barca (247-182 B.C.) was one of the greatest generals of antiquity. He deployed his cavalry in a flexible way by the mixture of lightly armored and heavily armored horses. During the early battles his elephants terrified Roman legionnaires who were unfamiliar with contesting against these animals. After Lake Trasimene all of the elephants died from combat or natural causes but one. Hannibal won spectacular battles at Ticinus (218 B.C.), Trebia (218), Lake Trasimene (217) and Cannae (216 B.C.).²⁷ The Battle of Cannae was a particular disaster for the Romans. The legionnaires lost about 60,000 men, while the Carthaginian army suffered 6,000 casualties.²⁸ In addition, Hannibal captured ten thousand of Roman prisoners. Hannibal offered the Roman Senate terms for peace and an exchange of prisoners. His delegation was allowed inside the City but not granted an audience. The Senate voted against ransom for the Roman captives and any form of peace terms.²⁹ Hannibal must have been shocked. Now he realized the nature of the enemy he faced. Either he must completely destroy the Roman Republic or be destroyed by it.

Roman strategy changed from offensive operations to delaying actions, skirmishes and asymmetric warfare. Although Hannibal continued to have successes on the battlefield, there were stalemates, inconclusive battles, and Roman attacks on Carthaginian logistical supplies. Roman strength grew in south-central Italy while the Carthaginian army struggled with logistical problems. In 207 B.C. Rome went back of the offensive. The Roman Consul Gaius Claudius Nero (3rd century B.C.) scored successes at the Battles of Grumentum, Venusia and Metaurus in 207 B.C.

Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal Barca, died during the battle of Metaurus.³⁰ Then between 207-206 Publius Cornelius Scipio (236-183 B.C.) won major battles in Spain and seized Carthaginian bases there.³¹

With Hannibal on the defensive and experiencing logistical difficulties, Scipio decided to make a clever but risky move. He would conduct offensive sea-ground task force operations in North Africa aimed at Carthage. The invasion took place in 204 B.C. Scipio's army won important victories and threatened to lay siege to Carthage itself. The Carthaginian Supreme Council ordered Hannibal and his army back to North Africa to defend their empire. The decisive battle took place at Zama in 202 B.C. Hannibal had an army of 50,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 80 elephants. Rome forged an alliance with King Massinissa of Numidia and fielded a total force of 23,000 infantry and 31,000 cavalry.³² Hannibal's expert use of cavalry was overridden by the superiority in numbers of the enemy cavalry.

In 202 B.C. both armies prepared for battle on the plains of Zama in North Africa, by placing their infantry in three lines. The Roman lines formed intervals between the maniples as corridors to allow Hannibal's elephants to pass through the lines. Elephants cannot veer to the right or left at full charge. Cavalry formed on the wings of the two infantry columns. An elephant charge by the Carthaginians produced little damage. Roman trumpeters sounded the signal for a cavalry charge which drove the Carthaginian cavalry off the field. The infantry of the two armies advanced forward for close combat. The contest was even until the Roman and Numidian cavalry returned to attack the rear of the Carthaginian formation. Carthaginian resistance collapsed and Scipio won a great victory. The Carthaginian army suffered 20,000 casualties, 20,000 prisoners and 11 elephants. The Romans lost 1,500 men. The Second Punic War came to an end.³³

Summative Analysis: Microcosmic causes of the Second Punic War were revenge on the part of Hannibal and the Carthaginian Supreme Council for their defeat during the First Punic War, and the anxiety of the Senate and people of Rome for the threat posed by Carthage to the existence of the Republic. Macrocosmic reasons for the war were the Roman desire to preserve the territorial gains seized during the First Punic War including control over the Western Mediterranean Sea and the lands surrounding it, especially Spain. Carthage aimed at retaining Spain and recovering territory in Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily, as well as its former dominance over the Western Mediterranean Sea.

Roman-Parthian Wars (66 B.C.-A.D. 217)

Parthia was a kingdom southwest of the Caspian Sea and north of the Persian Gulf that became an empire, stretching from Syria to India. Huntington places modern lands occupied by Parthia within the parameter of Islamic Civilization. Rome is located in the parameter of Western Civilization. As Parthia embarked on military expansionism westward, Roman expansionism moved eastward. Armies from both empires collided in Carrhae (present day Turkey) in 53 B.C. Marcus Licinius Crassus

²⁴ Polybius, *The Histories of Polybius*, 3.33-35.

²⁵ Livy, *History of Rome*, 21.38.

²⁶ Livy, *History of Rome*, 21.17.

²⁷ Livy, *History of Rome*, 21,26-29, 54-56, 22,4-7, Polybius, *The Histories of Polybius*, 3.65, 71-74, 83-84.

²⁸ Livy, *History of Rome*, 22.43-49, Polybius 3.110-117.

²⁹ Livy, *History of Rome*, 22.61

³⁰ Livy, *History of Rome*, 27.41-49.

³¹ Livy, *History of Rome*, 28.12-15.

³² Appian, *The Punic Wars*, 7.40-41.

³³ Livy, *History of Rome*, 30, 32-35., Polybius, *The Histories Of Polybius*, 15.9-14, Appian, *The Punic Wars*, 40-47.

(115-53 B.C.), denied a triumph during the Third Servile War (73-71 B.C.) in favor of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey) (106-48 B.C.) was determined to achieve this distinction on the battlefield.³⁴ He left Syria with a force of 35,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and about 4,000 velites to confront the Parthian General Surenas, and a large fighting force featured by heavily armored horseback archers. Camel trains loaded with arrows kept the archers continuously supplied. Some of the Parthian cavalry were armed with long pikes to discourage an attack by the Roman infantry. The total fighting force of Surenas could have been 10,000 men, including 1,000 armored cavalry, additional light armed cavalry and 1,000 camels.³⁵ The horseback archers proved superior to infantry armed with swords. The result was a complete rout of the Roman army. Crassus died in the fighting, 20,000 Romans were killed and 10,000 taken prisoner.³⁶

Emboldened by their victory at Carrhae, the Parthians invaded Syria in 51 B.C. They underestimated Roman defensive warfare. Roman armies fought behind defensive fortifications with walls 12-15 feet high. The fortification contained towers from which to hurl flaming missiles from catapults or flaming arrows at an approaching enemy. One or more large v-shaped ditches six feet deep surrounded the position. In front of the ditches were concealed pits with sharpened stakes. The Romans scattered Stimuli, wood blocks with iron hooks fixed in them, around the battlefield zone.³⁷

Osaces led an army of unknown strength against the legion of Gaius Cassius (died 42 B.C.) at Antigonea. The Romans easily defeated the Parthian force and killed Osaces. The Romans did not stay on the defensive whenever offensive operations were possible. In 39 B.C. Marcus Antonius (Marc Antony's) (83 B.C.-30 B.C.), legate, Publius Ventidius (94-37 B.C.), launched an attack against the Parthians at the Cilician Gates (border between Cilicia and Syria). Ventidius encamped on a steep hill. By occupying the high ground he placed the Parthian cavalry at the disadvantage. The Parthians attacked uphill and were easily defeated by the Roman infantry.³⁸ Cilicia was again controlled by Rome. Ventidius then moved to attack a Parthian force under the command of General Phranapates at Mount Amanus. This time Ventidius employed speed and surprise to obtain a Roman victory. Phranapates died in the conflict.³⁹

The Parthian General Pacorus invaded Syria in 38 B.C. and again Ventidius chose to confront the Parthian cavalry on hilly terrain at Gindarus in the northern part of the territory. The Parthian cavalry was driven back with heavy casualties including Pacorus himself.⁴⁰ Encouraged by Roman successes in 36 B.C. Marc Antony led a large army into Parthia itself. He had a total force of 60,000 infantry and

10,000 cavalry. Fighting on flat territory favored the Parthian cavalry archers. The size of the rival force led by Phraates IV is not documented. However, based on past battles we can assume that it included thousands of cavalry, camels and archer bearers. Phraates used a strategy of divide and conquer. He first attacked Antony's 300 wagons of supplies and siege-engines, which lagged behind his main offensive force. The 10,000 men and its leader, Oppius Statianus, were killed and the supply wagons and siege equipment were seized or destroyed. At the Battle of Phraaspa, Antony lost another 30,000 men. The rest of his forces withdrew to friendly territory.⁴¹

Summative Analysis: Microcosmic causes for the Roman-Parthian Wars were the egotism of Marcus Crassus, Marc Antony, Pacorus, Osaces, Phranapates as well as revenge on both sides for lost battles and campaigns. Macrocosmic reasons for the war were control over the valuable territories of Cilicia, Syria and Armenia.

The Advent of Christianity and Islam

The evolution of two major religions, Christianity and Islam, changed the dynamics of territorial disputes between the states of Western Europe and the states of Southern Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. In 380 B.C. the Roman Emperor Flavius Theodosius Augustus (Theodosius I) (347-395) proclaimed Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire. After the collapse of the Western Roman Empire in 476, Christianity would serve as a proto-ideology to bind together a mosaic of Germanic kingdoms in Western Europe. The rise of Islam would serve as a proto-ideology to bind together nations of southern Asia and North Africa. A policy of imperialism is in need of an ideology or proto-ideology to justify imperialistic expansionism. In Western Civilization political ideologies and Judeo-Christian values syncretized to provide the basis for territorial expansion. In South Asia and North Africa political ideologies and Islamic values syncretized to provide the basis for territorial expansion. Arab imperialism during the 7th and 8th centuries justified itself as the fulfillment of a religious duty. Driven by the zeal of Jihad a system of caliphates spread from Saudi Arabia through the Middle East to North Africa, Spain and Sicily in the west, and to the borders of China and northern India in the east. A caliphate is a territory led by a Sunni caliph who exercised absolute political, religious and civic authority. A decisive battle between Islamic forces and a Frankish army led by Charles Martel at Tours France in 732 stopped the further Arab invasion of Europe.⁴²

The Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) occupied most of modern Spain and Portugal in 711 as well as Albania. The Fatimid Caliphate (909-1171) occupied Sicily in 965. Arab dominance of the Silk Roads (114 B.C.-1450s), trade routes between Europe to China, were interrupted by the Arab dominance in the East.⁴³ The threat of Arab expansionism in other parts of Europe caused the kingdoms of Germany and all or parts of Austria, Belgium, The Czech Republic, Denmark, France, northern Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland, and other territories to

³⁴ Plutarch, "Crassus," Plutarch's Lives, 11.

³⁵ Dio Cassius, Roman History, 40.20-23., Plutarch, "Crassus," Plutarch's Lives, 20-21.

³⁶ Plutarch, "Crassus" Plutarch's Lives, 22-31.

³⁷ Goldsworthy, Adrian: The Complete Roman Army (London: Thames & Hudson, 2003), 88-89.

³⁸ Plutarch, "Antony" Plutarch's Lives, 33-34., Dio Cassius, Roman History, 48.39-40.

³⁹ Plutarch, "Antony" Plutarch's Lives, 33-34., Dio Cassius, Roman History, 48.41-44.

⁴⁰ Plutarch, "Antony," Plutarch's Lives, 34.1, Dio Cassius, Roman History, 49.19-23.

⁴¹ Plutarch, "Antony," Plutarch's Lives, 38-39, Dio Cassius, Roman History, 49.25-32.

⁴² Donner, F.M., The Early Islamic Conquests, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 14-37.

⁴³ Frankopan, Peter, the Silk Roads (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016), 132-196.

create a defense alliance named the Holy Roman Empire (962-1806). Otto I, a German king was elected Emperor of the Romans in 962. The emperors turned back invasions from the East that could have overrun all of Western Europe.⁴⁴ Western Civilization went on the offensive again. The Crusades took place between the 11th and 14th centuries to recover the Holy Land, particularly Jerusalem from Islam. However, territorial ambitions were also a motive. The nobles hoped for bounty and territorial possessions and the Italian cities hoped for expanded trade with the Near East.⁴⁵ The crusades accomplished little in the exchange of territories. However, they did engender greater hatred among the people of Islamic and Western civilizations.

Islamic forces, as part of the Ottoman Empire (1299-1923) struck back with a successful invasion of the Balkans between 1362 and 1389. Mehmet II, an Ottoman sultan, led an army which conquered the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantine Empire) in 1453. At its height in the 16th and 17th centuries the Empire controlled much of Southeast Europe, Western Asia, the Caucasus, North Africa, and parts of East Africa. Most troublesome for the West was Ottoman control over much of the trade along the Mediterranean Sea.⁴⁶ The Empire's defeat and the occupation of much of its territory by Allied Powers after World War I resulted in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the state of Turkey in 1923.⁴⁷ In response to the threat posed by the Ottoman Empire, and the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, on March 9, 1814, Russia, Austria and Prussia signed the Treaty of Chaumont. The Treaty, referred to as the Holy Alliance, bound the sovereigns of these states to conduct themselves according to Christian principles. Most sovereigns of Europe adhered to the alliance.⁴⁸ As the power of the Ottoman Empire declined, between 1880 and 1914, the countries of Western Europe responded with the seizure of foreign territories through a policy of widespread imperialism.

Western colonialism spread throughout much of the non-Western world during the 19th century and early 20th centuries. The Industrial Revolution required consumer markets, raw materials and inexpensive labor for the expanding European countries. Spain, France, Italy and Great Britain, which Huntington places in Western Civilization possessed colonies throughout northern Africa,⁴⁹ which Huntington places in Islamic Civilization. The 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement between Great Britain and France secretly created the colonization of the Middle East which Huntington places in Islamic Civilization. During World War II most Arab states remained neutral or sided with the Allied nations, except for Libya (an Italian colony) and Iraq. After the war, nationalism swept across Indo-China, Africa and Asia leading to scores of new

states. Nationalism created independent states in North Africa and the Middle East.⁵⁰

As part of the new nationalistic movements, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 provided for the creation of the new state of Israel on November 29, 1947,⁵¹ and Israel became an independent state on May 14, 1948. The Arab states in the region looked upon the State of Israel as an outpost of Western Civilization transplanted into Islamic Civilization. The majority of the population of Israel was non-Arabic, non-Islamic, and the new state displaced territory formerly occupied by Palestinians. The Arab states of Egypt, Syria (Transjordan (Jordan), Lebanon and Iraq rejected the mandate and invaded Israel during the 1948-1949 War. Israel prevailed in the conflict and subsequently won conventional wars against Arab states in 1956, 1967 (The Six-Day War), and 1973-1974 (The Yom Kippur War).⁵² Because of the strong military support of Israel by the technologically superior United States, hostile Islamic states recognized that they could not confront Israel or the United States in conventional War. Therefore, they adopted the strategy of asymmetric warfare. The U.S. Department of Defense defines Asymmetric Warfare as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations."⁵³ "Asymmetric Warfare employs small independent bands of fighters who harass an enemy by sudden raids, ambushes, insurgencies and terrorism. The strategic goal of asymmetric warfare is to erode an adversary's power, influence and will. The main targets are the morale of the enemy soldiers and public opinion in the enemy state."⁵⁴

The favorite tactical operation of radical Islam is terrorism. Terrorism is "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals."⁵⁵ The most common type of terrorist tactics is: threat or hoax, arson, sabotage, bombing, kidnapping, hostage taking, hijacking, raid or ambush, seizure, assassination and suicide operations.⁵⁶ Toward the end of the 1970's a jihadist movement of Sunni origin emerged as a means of restoring regional caliphates. Two major groups are al Qaeda, IS (Islamic State) and their affiliates worldwide. Al Qaeda is a radical Islamic group organized by Osama bin Laden in the 1980s to engage in terrorist activities against Western Civilization, and other entities inimical to its goals.⁵⁷

The most notorious success of al-Qaeda was the hijacking of four U.S. domestic flights, including two planes that crashed into the World Trade Center towers in New York City, and one into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. The

⁴⁴ Wilson, Peter, H. *A History of the Holy Roman Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016), 1-37.

⁴⁵ Riley-Smith, Jonathan, *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1-24.

⁴⁶ Shaw, Stanford, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge: University Press, 1977), vol. 1:1-26.

⁴⁷ Quataert, Donald, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* (Cambridge: University Press, 2005), 110-116.

⁴⁸ Morgenthau, Hans, *J. Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 448-455.

⁴⁹ Duiker, William J. *World History* (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth Group, 2004), 574-600.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 925-960.

⁵¹ U.N., General Assembly, Resolution 181 (II) B "The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine, New York, November 27, 1947.

⁵² U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, "U.S. Relations With Israel," Fact Sheet, Washington, D.C., March 10, 2014, 1-2.

⁵³ U.S., Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Counterterrorism", Joint Publication 3-26, Washington, D.C., November 13, 2009, viii.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, viii.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, GL-10.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* xiv.

⁵⁷ Challiand, Gerard, *The History of Terrorism* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2007), 314-321

attack killed nearly 3,000 people.⁵⁸ ISIL (The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) is a Salafi Jihadist militant group that follows an Islamic fundamentalist, Wahhabi doctrine of Sunni Islam. Its most notorious success is establishing a shadow government known as the Islamic State in territories of the countries of Syria and Iraq in June 2014.⁵⁹ Biddle suggests that the major goal of al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was “to control territory and defend key geographic objectives.”⁶⁰ The same goal could be true of ISIL in Iraq and Syria.

The U.S. Government and its allies conducted conventional and asymmetric warfare against terrorist organizations. Examples of conventional warfare include: Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2014) in Afghanistan; Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2011) and Operation Inherent Resolve (2014-) in Iraq and Syria. An example of asymmetric warfare is Operation Neptune Spear, the killing of Osama bin Laden in a raid in Pakistan by U.S. NAVY SEALs, working in conjunction with agents of the Central Intelligence Agency on May 2, 2011.⁶¹ The ultimate goals of Islamic terrorist organizations are the creation of regional totalitarian caliphates or other forms of totalitarian Islamic states and, ultimately a worldwide Islamic state. All states require a political community occupying a definite territory. Therefore, territory remains a salient objective of imperialistic political systems from ancient Greek to modern times.

Summative Analysis: Microcosmic causes for the conflict between radical Islamic organizations and the countries of Western Civilization are egotism, revenge and perhaps psychopathy on the part of leaders such as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the terrorists which carry out suicide bombings and commit other atrocities. Another microcosmic factor is the fear and anxiety of people of the countries which are attacked. Examples are: Paris (November 13, 2015), San Bernardino, California (December 2, 2015) and Brussels, Belgium (March 22, 2016). The proto-ideologies of Christianity and Islam exacerbate these sentiments. Macrocsmic causes are the desire to acquire or retain valuable territories. Examples are the Palestine Liberation Organization in Palestine (P.L.O.), The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (P.K.K.) in northern Iraq, and ISIL in Syria and Iraq. Christianity and Islam serve as catalysts by virtue of which potential clashes are imminent.

Civilizations, the Territorial Imperative and International Conflict

Huntington writes “Historically one major issue was the control of territory, but that is now relatively insignificant.... Wars could come from different civilizations, most likely involving Muslims on the one side and non-Muslims on the other.”⁶² This concept is incompatible with Russian military intervention in Ukraine (2014-) or the Syrian Civil War (2011-) which is intra-civilizational conflicts involving control over territory, rather than inter-civilizational conflicts. The severance of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran (2016)

⁵⁸ Ibid., 413-419.

⁵⁹ U.S., Department of Defense, and Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (Arlington, VA.: The Pentagon), 1-2.

⁶⁰ Biddle, Stephen, *Military Power* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 7.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 14.

⁶² Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 212, 312.

demonstrates that Islamic Civilization is not a unified entity. In addition, Chinese efforts to control the strategic waterway known as the South China Sea by occupying the Paracel and Spratly islands, as well as constructing artificial islands and infrastructures, indicate a desire to control valuable territory by China. One-third of the sea trade of the world sails through the South China Sea. The actions of the Russians and Chinese hint at the fact that egotism and the desire to obtain or maintain valuable territories are still part of the ideological or political issues of modern civilizations.⁶³

Why are egotism, dominance status and the struggle to obtain and maintain valuable territories common in ancient and modern times? Hans Morgenthau believes that the struggle for power has its roots in human nature. Morgenthau writes: “Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man.”⁶⁴ While I do not believe this is true of all people, I do believe the struggle for power is common among some politicians who seek public office chiefly for their own profit or that of their party. Egotism is related to seeking and maintaining public office. As for territory, Robert Ardrey asserts human beings are a territorial species. He writes: “Man considers it his inherent right to own property, either as an individual or as a member of a group or both”⁶⁵ Few people could survive without the farms, ranches, orchards and water reservoirs upon which their food and water is produced. These food and water resources come from territories known as property.

We live in homes located within local, regional and national governments all of which are located within defined territories.⁶⁶ Ardrey relates the development of nations and nationalism to a biological expression found in all social mammals.⁶⁷ Therefore, the drive to acquire and maintain territory is part of the nature of humankind. Abraham Maslow identifies several basic human needs. Among these are physiological needs such as air, food, water, shelter, warmth, sex and sleep. Maslow writes: Undoubtedly, these physiological needs are the most prepotent of all needs.”⁶⁸ Many of these needs cannot be satisfied without territory in the form of property. He also identifies esteem needs. Among the esteem needs is achievement, fame, glory, status, dominance and prestige.⁶⁹ These needs are especially strong in politicians. Some national leaders may use military imperialism to acquire valuable territory at the expense of an economically, militarily weaker country. This is contrary to another of Maslow’s basic needs in the form of safety. The safety needs include security, order and law. International law, the United Nations Charter and regional defense alliance agreements serve to discourage and prevent military imperialism. Therefore the leader of a state which embarks on a policy of military imperialism against a weaker state may suffer from some form of personality disorder, such as

⁶³ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 252-254.

⁶⁴ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 4-5.

⁶⁵ Robert Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative* (Rome: Atheneum, 1966), 83.

⁶⁶ Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative*, 91.

⁶⁷ Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative*, 177.

⁶⁸ Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 36.

⁶⁹ Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, 45-45-46.

narcissist personality disorder or even psychopathy and antisocial personality disorder.⁷⁰ Hare has pointed out that “Many psychopaths emerge as patriots and saviors in societies experiencing social, economic, and political upheaval by exploiting ethnic, cultural, or racial tensions and grievances.”⁷¹

Conclusion

The argument that future conflicts and wars will occur among six or seven civilizations is a magnificent illusion created by Huntington. Ajami (1993) has observed that “civilizations do not control states; states control civilizations.”⁷² This study points out that microcosmic and macrocosmic factors involving states rather than civilizational differences, including religion, are the causes of conflicts between Western Europe and North Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia. Micro factors include egotism, dominance status, ideological differences, revenge, and sometimes personality disorders. Macro factors include the quest for and maintenance of valuable land and sea territories. The evolution of two major religions, Christianity and Islam changed the dynamics of territorial conflicts between countries or empires in the West or East by intensifying territorial disputes. Soldiers and suicide-bombers are pawns in wars which leaders struggle to expand or retain territory. While giving Samuel Huntington the acknowledgment he is due through his insights on civilizational differences among the countries of the world, this study provides an alternate explanation to conflicts between nation states and nongovernmental organizations, (such as ISIL, al-Qaeda and Hamas), without placing civilizations at the heart of the conflicts. The aforementioned microcosmic and macrocosmic factors have remained the same in ancient and modern times. Perhaps political cleavages among states in the form of differing political systems and political expediency are more important to the formation of military alliances than civilizational solidarity. For example, the League of Arab States is a much disunited organization, even though the countries that make up the League are part of Islamic Civilization. This study is designed to offer a different way of approaching the interpretation of historical events. The analysis of ancient wars does not conclusively prove that there are strong implications for the present or the future.

Bibliography

1. Appian. *The Punic Wars*.
2. Ardrey, Robert. *The Territorial Imperative*. Rome: Atheneum, 1966.
3. Assembly, United Nations General. "Resolution 181 (II) B "The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine"." New York, 1947.
4. *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs OASD(PA)*. <http://www.defense.gov/About-DoD/Office-of-the-Secretary-of-Defense/OASD-PA>.
5. Butcher, James N. *Abnormal Psychology*. New York: Pearson, 2014.
6. Cassius, Dio. *Roman History*.
7. Challiand, Gerard. *The History of Terrorism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007.
8. Donner, F.M. *The Early Islamic Conquests*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.
9. Duiker, William J. *World History*. Belmont: Wadsworth Group, 2004.
10. Frankopan, Peter. *The Silk Roads*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016.
11. Goldsworthy, Adrian. *The Complete Roman Army*. London: Thames & Hudson, 2003.
12. Herodotus. *The Histories*.
13. Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997.
14. Livy. *History of Rome*.
15. Maslow, Abraham H. *Motivation and Personality*. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.
16. Morgenthau, Hans. *Politics Among Nations*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973.
17. Morgenthau, Hans, J. *Politics Among Nations*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978.
18. Plutarch. *Plutarch's Lives*. 1517.
19. Polybius. *The Histories of Polybius*.
20. Quataert, Donald. *The Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge: University Press, 2005.
21. Riley-Smith, Jonathan, (:,),. *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
22. Shaw, Stanford. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. 1st Edition. Cambridge: University Press, 1977.
23. Staff, Joint Chiefs of. *Counterterrorism*. Joint Publication, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2009, 3-26.
24. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. "Relations With Israel." March 10, 2014. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3581.htm>.
25. Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
26. Wilson, Peter, H. *A History of the Holy Roman Empire*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016.

⁷⁰ James N. Butcher, *Abnormal Psychology* (New York: Pearson, 2014), 339, 353-354.

⁷¹ R.D. Hare, *Psychopathy, affect and behavior* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publications, 1998), 128-129.

⁷² Fouad Ajami, "The Summoning," *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (September/October, 1993), 2-9.