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# Impact of Regulatory Frameworks on CSR Disclosure Practice in Some Selected Money Deposit Banks in Nigeria

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#### **Abstract**

The study examined the impact of regulatory frameworks oncorporate social responsibility(CSR) disclosure on money deposit banks in Nigeria. The study used secondary panel data obtained from the Nigerian Exchange Group (NGX) Fact Books for various years, SEC Annual Reports as it covers the years of enquiries (2012 to 2022), and Global Reporting Initiative GRI. Variables such as CSR disclosure scoreas dependent variable and firm size, ownership, Board size, board meetings and levevage as independent variables were incorporated into the model. Utilizing SPSS V.22 computer software, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and multiple regression analysis using the OLS method was adopted to identify the type of relationship between the variables. The key finding is that firm size (FSIZE) has a significant positive impact on CSR disclosure, supporting hypothesis Ha5. This means larger companies tend to disclose more CSR information compared to smaller ones. It was therefore concluded that regulatory bodies should set standards for the type of information DMBs need to include in their CSR reports. This could encompass environmental practices, social impact programs, community engagement, and employee well-being.

**Keywords:** CSR Disclosure; Regulatory framework; Deposit Money Banks, Nigerian Exchange Group; Listed Companies.

### 1. Introduction

Corporations face growing scrutiny from a wide range of stakeholders regarding their social impact on the areas in which they operate. Over the recent decades, large firms responded by developing and disclosing corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. From the perspective of economic governance, CSR is often discussed as an alternative to or even substitute for government regulation (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Matten & Moon, 2008). CSR initiatives are seen as representing an important form of self-regulation whereby firms adopt pro-social policies willingly and stakeholders reward and sanction these policies through their market dealings. To the extent that social engagement is relevant to stakeholders, market-led governance may create a strong "business case" for CSR.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) refers to a company's voluntary contribution to sustainable development which goes beyond legal requirements. This issue has recently gained much attention from various stakeholders at societal, political, and global levels. Academics and policymakers are increasingly interested in ways to reduce the negative environmental and social impacts of business activities (Gull et al., 2023). Perrini (2005) opined that CSR and CSR disclosure means not only fulfilling legal expectations but also going beyond compliance and investing 'more' into human capital, the environment and the relations with stakeholders'

The enthusiasm for the world to pay attention to firms' sustainability activities originated from the discovery of several corporate scandals, such as those of Enron, WorldCom and Lehman Brothers and also such as the beyond petroleum campaign by British Petroleum and Volkswagen's *diesel gate* scandal (Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2021). Such instances made the significance of CSR-related corporate disclosure even more clear. Academics have identified a number of reasons for the notable rise in companies' social and environmental disclosures,

including corporate social visibility, corporate governance (CG) mechanisms, and political, social, and cultural factors (Ali et al., 2017). In a similar vein, studies examining the effects of CSR disclosure reveal significant financial gains for the reporting companies. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and CSR disclosure seem to be receiving more attention in the wake of recent corporate scandals like those involving Enron, WorldCom, and Lehman Brothers.

Given the enormous annual costs associated with corporate social responsibility (CSR), the broad consensus is that CSR has the potential to boost business earnings. However, very few managers and executives are aware of the study being done on this crucial topic. The majority of CEOs think that CSR can increase revenue. They understand that CSR can promote respect for their company in the marketplace which can result in higher sales, enhance employee loyalty and attract better personnel to the firm. Also, CSR activities focusing on sustainability issues may lower costs and improve efficiencies as well. An added advantage for public companies is that aggressive CSR activities may help them gain a possible listing in the stock exchange, or other similar listing. This may enhance the company's stock price, making executives" stock and stock options more profitable and shareholders happier (Robins,

To ensure openness, however, a thorough analysis of the volume and quality of corporate social responsibility disclosure is desperately needed. This is especially true in emerging nations like Nigeria where there is limited of CSR research.

The main objective of this study is to determine how regulatory framework influence the extent and quality of CSR disclosure made by deposit money banks in Nigeria. Specific objectives of the study are to:

- i. Determine the extent to which firm size influence the CSR disclosure of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria.
- ii. Examine how ownership structure affects the CSR disclosure of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria.
- iii. Investigate the degree to which profitability affects the CSR disclosure of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria.
- iv. Analyze how board size influences the CSR disclosure of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria.
- v. Determine the extent to which board meetings influence the CSR disclosure of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria.
- vi. Investigate how leverage affects the CSR disclosure of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria.
- vii. Examine the extent to which corporate sector influence the CSR disclosure of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria.

## 2.0 Literature Review

## 2.1 Conceptual Review

# 2.1.1 Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD)

Corporate social responsibility has no single commonly accepted definition. The concept is a fuzzy one with unclear boundaries. It generally refers to business practices based on ethical values, with respect for people,

communities and the environment (Lambardo, 2009). Longe, Necker, Moore, Petty & Palich (2006) contend that corporate social responsibility comprises varying degrees of conceiting and trustworthy actions of ethical obligations to customers, employees and the community. Mc Oliver & Yomere (2009) defined social responsibilities at the long range goals of an organization inevitably focused upon its contributions to the needs of society tangible or intangible, its contribution may be in terms of goods or services or both.

Similarly, social responsibility of firms is necessary for the following reasons: it helps firms to extend aid to societies need; it helps firms to use business resources to promote the interests of all stakeholders affected by a company's operations; social responsibility helps the firm to respond to changing public needs and expectations; it helps the firm or business to recognize its moral obligations; and social responsibility facilitates a firm's correction of some problems caused by the business, for example, pollution of the environment (Ikan, 2004).

## 2.1.2 Concept of Regulatory Framework (RF)

A regulatory framework refers to a system of legal mechanisms that establish rules, standards, and procedures governing specific activities or sectors (Security Sector Integrity). These mechanisms can be found on a national or international level, and they can take many different forms, such as rules and regulations that must be followed, contractual obligations, or even voluntary measures like codes of conduct. Establishing a transparent legal basis for decision-making and enforcement in a specific area is the major goal of a regulatory framework. This fosters predictability, transparency, and accountability for all parties concerned.

In Nigeria, the concept of a mandatory regulatory framework for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure by banks is still under development. Currently, CSR initiatives undertaken by banks are largely voluntary acts of philanthropy (Ediagbonya, 2020) extend\_ more the absence of laws might result in inconsistent reportingand a potential for superficial CSR efforts. Advocates of a mandatory framework argue that it would enhance transparency and hold banks accountable for their social and environmental impact. A structured framework could outline specific CSR disclosure requirements, making sure banks provide information on pertinent topics such as environmental sustainability, community development, and employee welfare. As a result, decision-makers would be able to evaluate a bank's commitment to corporate social responsibility.

# **2.1.3** Concept of Corporate Sector (Control Variable)

The concept of the corporate sector encompasses a broad range of organizations that operate within the framework of corporate governance structures, serving as key drivers of economic activity and development in modern economies (Crane, Matten & Spence, 2019). These organizations, which are sometimes called corporations or firms, differ in terms of size, scope, and industry emphasis, but they all have limited liability, independent legal personalities, and the capacity to raise capital by issuing shares. At the heart of the corporate sector lies the pursuit of profit maximization and value creation for shareholders, while also balancing the interests of other stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers, and the wider community

(Crane et al., 2019).

Corporate sector entities play a pivotal role in shaping the economic landscape by mobilizing resources, generating employment, fostering innovation, and driving productivity growth. As engines of economic growth, corporations contribute to GDP expansion, wealth creation, and poverty reduction, thereby enhancing the overall standard of living within societies. Moreover, the corporate sector serves as a catalyst for technological advancement and industrialization, driving structural transformation and fostering competitiveness in global markets (Freeman et al., 2019).

# 2.2 Theoretical Review Institutional Theory

Institutional theory offers valuable insights into the potential development of a mandatory CSR disclosure framework for Nigerian banks. This theory emphasizes the role of social norms, cultural expectations, and established practices in shaping organizational behavior (Scott, W. Richard, 2014). Organizations experience pressure to conform to prevailing institutional standards. A mandatory disclosure framework would establish a new standard for CSR reporting in the Nigerian banking sector. Banks, seeking legitimacy and positive social standing, would likely adapt their practices to comply with the framework. This aspect demonstrates how businesses imitate their successful competitors. Enforcing a statutory framework could force successful banks with strong CSR reporting processes to serve as role models for others, hence increasing pressure on the industry to embrace strong CSR disclosure.

## **Legitimacy Theory**

Legitimacy Theory Liu et al (2006) argue that a wide body of literature uses legitimacy theory to explain incentives for corporate voluntary disclosure (Liu et al, 2006: 8). According to legitimacy theory, CSD aims to legitimise company behaviour by providing information intended to High economic level Pressure groups social pressure Society's culture Increasing society conscious High level of corporate governance The level of CSD -131- influence stakeholders' and eventually society's perceptions about the company (Hooghiemstra, 2000: 57). Zimmerman & Zeitz (2002: 416). Companies need to be in accordance with society's rules to gain acceptance (legitimacy) from other areas of society. According to Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) legitimacy is not directly observable and has to be conceived as a social assessment or appraisal of acceptance, appropriateness and/or desirability. Thus, it can be argued that the legitimacy theory provides a framework to explain both determinants and consequences of CSD.

## 2.3 Empirical Review

Oriaje (2023) investigated the impact of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure and financial performance of listed Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria. The study adopted ex-post facto research design. The population of the study was the fifteen DMBs listed on the floor of Nigerian Exchange Group of which thirteen (13) were sampled out using scientific sampling technique. Panel data collected from sampled insurance firms were sourced from their annual report from 2009 to 2022. The CSR such as financial inclusion and economic empowerment, educational and health initiatives, environmental sustainability and social infrastructure development represent the CSR disclosure in this study. Multiple regressions analysis was employed. The first model adopts pooled OLS while the second model employs OLS to ascertain the impact. The study found financial inclusion and economic empowerment, educational and health environmental sustainability: initiatives. social infrastructure development had an insignificant impact on net interest margin (NIM) and financial performance proxied by Tobin's Q except for financial inclusion and economic empowerment that had significant impact on financial performance proxy by Tobin Q. From the cumulative regression analysis, the study concluded that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Disclosure have insignificant impact on financial performance of listed deposit money banks in Nigeria. The research recommends that DMBs in Nigeria shouldn't use this CSR as a guide when embarking to achieve sound financial results. When attempting to mitigate agency conflicts between managers and customers, it is important to take into account the varied interests that owners hold in their company.

Ogunleye et al. (2023) examined the impact of value relevance of corporate social responsibility disclosures of listed food manufacturing companies in the Nigerian consumer goods sector. It specifically investigated how the share prices of listed food manufacturing companies respond to publications on each of the four components of corporate social responsibility disclosures as required by the GRI framework. The social contract theory anchored the basis for this study. Census sampling technique was utilized for this study because all of the 9 listed food manufacturing companies in the consumer goods sector were observed. The annual reports, sustainability reports and NSE website for the ten-year period covering2011-2020 were content analysed for data on CSR and market price of share respectively. The hypotheses formulated were tested using multiple linear regression analysis. The study reveals that CSR disclosures are value relevant, however, human resources responsibility disclosures (the most disclosed component) has the least impact on the share prices, while in descending order of significance environmental responsibility disclosures (the least disclosed), In the Nigerian food business, the two biggest influences on the share prices of listed firms are the community responsibility and customers and products responsibility disclosures.

Ayon and Oyedokun (2022) conducted an exploration into the connection between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Financial Performance of specific Food and Beverage Companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The study's timeframe spanned from 2016 to 2020. The research adopted a combination of descriptive and inferential statistical methods to portray the population and make broader inferences from the sample results. The study's population consisted of seventeen (17) food and beverage firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, and secondary data were analyzed using the Stata software. Content analysis was utilized as the analytical method. The study employed the coefficient of determination, R squared, to assess the significance of the regression model in elucidating the link between corporate social responsibility practices as reported in annual reports and financial performance. Panel Least Squares Regression Analysis was utilized to test the hypotheses. The outcomes unveiled that community involvement displayed a positive vet statistically insignificant association with return on

capital employed, and likewise exhibited a positive but insignificant connection with earnings per share among food and beverage companies in Nigeria. In light of these findings, one of the study's recommendations was that food and beverage firms should work to improve the disclosures they make about their corporate social responsibility, especially the ones that have relatively lower disclosure levels.

The study conducted by Ayon and Oyedokun (2022) is subject to several limitations. The study's relatively short timeframe of five years might not capture long-term trends. Additionally, the use of Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) and Earnings Per Share (EPS) as financial performance indicators might not encompass all aspects of financial performance. Consequently, the findings may not have broad applicability outside of the particular setting of the food and beverage business in Nigeria.

Oluyinka (2021) investigates the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance using a study sample consisting12Deposit Money Banks listed on Nigeria Stock Exchange for ten years, 2009-2018. Three (3) corporate social responsibilities initiatives were chosen: Community development, Education and Health and while financial performance was measured by Return on Asset (ROA). Descriptive methods were used to assess the features of the variables, based on evaluating correlations and interdependences that exist between these variables. The study employed multiple linear regression, having carried out some diagnostic tests. One sample Kolmogorov test was employed for the normality test, Variance Inflation Factor and Durbin Watson for multicollinearity test and auto-correlation, respectively. Hausman's test was employed to select between fixed and random effect models, and the selections favored the random effect model. The study found out that CSR on Community Developments has a positive and significant effect on financial performance. On the contrary, the study reveals that CSR on Education has an insignificant positive effect on financial performance, and there is very little negligible negative effect of CSR on health. The report suggests that instead of participating in CSR initiatives blindly, Nigerian deposit money bank management should choose those initiatives that may address the interests of all the stakeholders.

The study by Oluvinka (2021) was limited to only three specific CSR initiatives: Community development, Education, and Health. This limited selection might not encompass the full spectrum of CSR activities that banks engage in, potentially overlooking other important initiatives. The study spans a period of ten years, from 2009 to 2018. However, this timeframe might not be adequate to capture longer- term effects of CSR initiatives on financial performance. The study also relies solely on Return on Asset (ROA) as the measure of financial performance. While ROA is a common metric, it might not capture all aspects of financial performance, and using additional metrics could provide a more comprehensive understanding.

## 2.4 Existing Gap

The empirical reviews shed light on various aspects of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure and its impact on financial performance in different sectors and industries. However, despite the valuable insights offered by these studies, there remains a notable gap in the literature regarding the influence of the regulatory framework on the extent and quality of CSR disclosure specifically within the context of deposit money banks (DMBs) in Nigeria.

Firstly, while previous studies have explored the relationship between CSR disclosure and financial performance, they have primarily focused on the effects of CSR initiatives on metrics such as return on capital employed (ROCE), earnings per share (EPS), and return on assets (ROA). However, there is limited understanding of how the regulatory environment shapes CSR disclosure practices within the banking sector. Understanding the regulatory framework surrounding CSR disclosure is crucial for policymakers, regulators, and bank executives in ensuring transparency, accountability, and adherence to regulatory requirements. Secondly, existing studies have largely overlooked the role of firm-specific characteristics such as firm size, ownership structure, profitability, and board characteristics in shaping CSR disclosure practices within the banking sector. These variables are essential determinants of CSR disclosure behavior and can significantly influence the extent and quality of disclosures made by DMBs. By incorporating these variables into the analysis, researchers can provide a more comprehensive understanding of the factors driving CSR disclosure practices within the banking industry.

# 3. Research Methodology

## 3.1 Research Design

This study incorporated the Ex-Post Facto research design. Ex-Post Facto research design assists in providing answers to who, what, when, where, and how questions connected to a specific study problem. In order to examine the Nigerian banking system, 14listed banks' annual reports and accounts were collected as secondary data for the design.

## 3.2 Population of the Study

The population of the study comprises 14 listed banks with Commercial Banking Licence and International Authorization listed on the floor of the Nigerian ExchangeGroup (NGX) as at 31 December, 2022. As at the time the study was conducted, there were fourteen (14) listed Deposit money banks in Nigeria as contained in Table 3.1 below:

Table 3.1: Listed Deposit Money Bank.

S/N	Listed Deposit Money Banks	Date Of Listing
1	Access Bank Plc	1998
2	ECO Bank Transnational Incorporated	2006
3	Citi Bank Nigeria	1984
4	First Bank of Nigeria Plc	1971
5	FCMB Group Plc	2004
6	Fidelity Bank Plc	2005
7	Guaranty Trust Bank	1996
8	Stanbic IBTC Holdings Plc	2012
9	Sterling Bank Plc	1993
10	Union Bank	2005
11	United Bank for Africa	1970
12	Unity Bank	2005
13	WEMA Bank Plc	1990
14	Zenith Bank Plc	2004

Source: NGX website, 2024.

### 3.3 Method of Data Collection

Being ex-post factor in nature, this study makes use of secondary panel dataobtained from the Nigerian Exchange Group (NGX) Fact Books for various years, and SEC Annual Reports as it covers the years of enquiries (2012 to 2022). The study sample consists of 154 respondents. All fourteen listed deposit money banks have an equal frequency of eleven, meaning each company makes up

7.14% of the total sample. This implies that the sample population is evenly distributed across the fourteen reporting deposit money banks, potentially reducing bias towards any particular deposit money bank and strengthening the generalizability of the findings to the wider population of similar entities.

### 3.4 Measurement of Variables

Table 3.2: Dependent, Independent and Control Variables.

Variables	Abbreviation	Operational Measurement
CSR Discloure Score (Dependent Variable)	CSRDS	The average percent of GRI-G4 items disclosed
Firm Size (Independent Variable)	FSIZE	Natural Log of Total Assets
Ownership (Independent Variable)	OWN	(Block Institutional Shares / Numbers of Shares)*100
Profitability (Independent Variable)	ROA	(Profit After Tax / Total Asset)*100
Board Size (Independent Variable)	BOS	Total Board Size
Board Meetings (Independent Variable)	BOM	Total Board Meetings
Leverage (Independent Variable	LEV	(Total Liabilities/Total Asset)*100
Corporate Sector (Control Variable)	COS	Dummy variable, takes value of "1" if firm is Private sector in year t, and "0" otherwise

Table 1 shows the dependent, independent and control variables for the study. The table lists the variables and assigns an abbreviation to each one for easier reference. The dependent variable is CSR Disclosure Score (CSRDS), which is the average percentage of GRI-G4 items disclosed by the firm. The GRI-G4 reporting framework is a widely used sustainability reporting standard. There are four independent variables. These are factors that the researchers are trying to see if they have an impact on the dependent variable (CSR disclosure score).

The independent variables are: Firm Size (FSIZE), which is measured by the natural log of the firm's total assets; Ownership (OWN), which is the percentage of the firm's shares that are owned by block institutional investors; Profitability (ROA), measured by the return on assets (ROA), which is the ratio of the firm's profit after tax to its total assets and; Board Size (BOS), which is the total number of directors on the firm's board. The table also shows one control variable called Corporate Sector (COS). This variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm is private and 0 if it is public.

## 3.5 Model Specification

The study adapted Oriaje (2023) model, which was modified to suit our study

The relationship between the dependent and independent variables were analyzedusing the below model:

 $Yit = \alpha 0 + \beta 1Xit + \beta 2Cit + \varepsilon it ----(1)$ 

Where Yit = Dependent Variable of firm i for time period t;  $\alpha 0$  = Constant

 $\beta$ 1 = Coefficient of explanatory variables;

Xit = Explanatory variables of firm i for time period t;

 $\beta$ 2 = Coefficient of control variables;

Cit = Control variables of Firm i for time period t; and

 $\epsilon it$  = Error term of Banks i Firm time period t.

Tobin's  $Qit = \beta 0 + \beta 1FSit + \beta 2OWNit + \beta 3ROAit + \beta 4BOSit + \beta 5BOMit + \beta 6LEVit + \beta 7COSit + \varepsilon it$ 

Where:FS = Firm Size; OWN = Ownership; ROA = Profitability; BOS = Board Size; BOM = Board Meetings; LEV = Leverage; COS = Corporate Sector;  $\epsilon it$  = Error Term;  $\beta 0 - \beta 5$  = Parametric Coefficients; i = Firm Observation: t = Time Observation

# 3.6 Method of Data Analysis

In this work, data analysis using a quantitative approach was used. Utilizing SPSS V.22 computer software, descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and multiple regression analysis using the OLS method was adopted to identify the type of relationship between the variables. The dependent variable is a linear function of the independent variables, according to the model's underlying assumptions.

## 4. Research Analysis And Findings

# 4.1 Descriptive Analysis

**Table 4.1:** Sample Population & Frequency Distribution By Entity.

Reporting Entity Information	Frequency	Percent	Cum.
Access Holdings Plc	11	7. 14	7.14
Citi Bank Nigeria Ltd	11	7. 14	14.29
Ecobank Nigera Ltd	11	7. 14	21.43
FBN Holding	11	7. 14	28.57
Fidelity Bank	11	7. 14	35.71
First City Monumental Bank	11	7. 14	42.86
Guaranty Trust Holding	11	7. 14	50.00
Stanbic Ibte Holding	11	7. 14	57.14
Sterling Bank	11	7. 14	64.29
Union Bank Of Nig	11	7. 14	71.43
United Bank For Africa	11	7. 14	78.57
Unity Bank	11	7. 14	85.71
Wema Bank	11	7. 14	92.86
Zenith Bank	11	7. 14	100.00
Total Observation(s)	154	100.00	

Source: SPSS Output (2024).

Table 4.1 shows that the data set consists of 154 observations, with each observation representing a single reporting entity. All fourteen listed deposit money banks have an equal frequency of eleven, meaning each company makes up 7.14% of the total sample. This implies that the

sample population is evenly distributed across the fourteen reporting deposit money banks, potentially reducing bias towards any particular deposit money bank and strengthening the generalizability of the findings to the wider population of similar entities.

Table 4.2: Frequency Distribution Of Dependent Variable.

CSRDS	Frequency	Percent	Cum.
0	18	11.69	11.69
14.28571	87	56.49	68.18
28.57143	32	20.78	88.96
42.85714	17	11.04	100.00
TOTAL	154	100	

Source: SPSS Output (2024).

None of the total observation had a CRS disclosure score of at least 50%. 49 observations have a disclosure score of at least 25% and 105 observations has less than <25% CSR disclosure score. This table shows you that of 11.04% (17 observations) of the total observations had a CSR Score of

42.85%, 20.78% (32 observations) of the total observations has a CSR score of 28.57%, 56.49% (87 observations) of the total observations has a CSR score of 14.28% and 11.69% (18 observations) of the total observations has a CSR score of 0%

Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics For Full Sample (N =154).

	N	Range	Mean	Median	Maximum	Minimum	Std. Deviation
CSRDS	154	42.85714	18.7384	14.28571	42.85714	0	11.72349
BOM	154	16	5.896104	5	16	0	2.487009
BOS	154	21	13.12338	14	21	0	3.750953
ROA	151	15.14852	1.709671	1.365633	5.616683	-9.531833	1.721698
LEV	151	178.503	91.37529	87.30531	254.749	76.24655	20.97733
FSIZE	132	4.175132	15.77027	15.68485	17.32244	13.14731	0.8940102
COS	154	0	1	1	1	1	0
OWN	120	91	31.83333	27.5	91	0	25.49389

Source: SPSS Output (2024).

The mean of the CSRDS is 18.73%. Which means that on average the sample firm disclose 17 items out of a total 91 indicators in GRI G-4.The COS has a mean of 1, which means that on the average the main corporate sector of the sample firms is private. The variable ROA has an average value of 1.7%. Which means that in average, the sample company's usage of assets generates 1.7% of net income, with the lowest ROA of -9.5% and highest of 5.6%. LEV has an average leverage of the sample company of 91.37%. This result points out that in average, sample companies

use more debt than equity to finance their assets. The OWN show an average of 31.83%, which means that the main investors in sample companies are Public investors.

 Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics By Entity.

Entity		CSRDS	вом	BOS	ROA	LEV	FSIZE	CO S	OWN
Access Holdings	Mean	23.3766	8.090909	16.54545	1.788598	88.7042	16.63322	1	22.3
	Median	28.5714	8	17	1.9172	87.4349 8	16.47995	1	19.5
	Maximum	28.5714	10	18	2.572006	91.8056	17.32244	1	35
	Minimum	0	6	15	1.041075	85.8064 6	16.22087	1	12
	Std. Deviation	9.63142 7	1.513575	1.21356	0.5209498	2.41467	0.377341	0	8.6801 2
	Range	28.5714	4	3	1.530931	5.99913 8	1.10158	0	23
	N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	10
Citi Bank Nigeria	Mean	0	3.727273	9.545455	4.031073	86.3725 2		1	
	Median	0	5	12	4.025013	86.2710		1	
	Maximum	0	7	15	5.360831	88.0565 3		1	
	Minimum	0	0	0	2.438502	84.7730 3		1	
	Std. Deviation	0	2.493628	6.202639	0.7436364	1.19093 7		0	•
	Range	0	7	15	2.922328	3.28350 1		0	
	N	11	11	11	9	9	0	11	0
Eco Bank Nigeria Limited	Mean	10.3896 1	6.909091	12.45455	0.733298	87.6139 5		1	
	Median	14.2857 1	7	14	0.6094474	87.5726 5		1	
	Maximum	14.2857 1	10	16	1.677062	89.2780 2		1	•
	Minimum	0	0	0	0.0630826	85.3899 5		1	•
	Std. Deviation	6.67284 8	2.586679	4.590504	0.5120104	1.23122 5		0	
	Range	14.2857 1	10	16	1.613979	3.88806 9		0	
	N	11	11	11	10	10	0	11	0
FBN Holding	Mean	32.4675 3	7.272727	10.18182	1.270166	88.4957 3	16.84528	1	0.6
	Median	42.8571 4	8	10	1.189839	87.9592 4	16.8248	1	0
	Maximum	42.8571 4	11	13	2.374982	90.5864	17.0846	1	6
	Minimum	14.2857 1	4	6	0.3618684	86.1072 1	16.59681	1	0
	Std. Deviation	14.415	2.327699	1.88776	0.6336589	1.68727 8	0.149147 8	0	1.8973 7
	Range	28.5714 3	7	7	2.013114	4.47921 8	0.487783 4	0	6
	N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	10
Fidelity Bank	Mean	14.2857 1	8.545455	15.27273	1.182675	87.2267	15.67085	1	0.7
	Median	14.2857 1	8	15	1.162233	85.7178 9	15.69757	1	0
	Maximum	14.2857	16	19	1.990463	92.1193 5	15.99979	1	7
	Minimum	14.2857 1	4	12	0.7141027	82.3423	15.32348	1	0
	Std. Deviation	0	3.8305	1.954017	0.3468155	3.07083	0.199722 9	0	2.2135 9
	Range	0	12	7	1.276361	9.77704 6	0.676301	0	7
First City Monument	N Mean	11 15.5844	11 5	11 11.18182	11 1.135539	11 87.0374	11 15.5177	11 1	10 32.2

Bank		2				7			
	Median	14.2857 1	5	11	1.043518	86.2861 1	15.56793	1	34.5
	Maximum	28.5714 3	6	15	1.892759	90.7517 7	15.77257	1	44
	Minimum	0	3	9	0.4105671	84.0692 1	15.17271	1	21
	Std. Deviation	7.70514 1	0.774596 7	1.601136	0.4306178	2.19944	0.191623	0	8.3904 7
	Range	28.5714 3	3	6	1.482192	6.68255 6	0.599861 1	0	23
	N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	10
Guaranty Trust Holdings	Mean	20.7792 2	4	13	4.31872	83.5021 6	16.33101	1	31.8
	Median	14.2857 1	4	14	4.244671	83.7523 7	16.38977	1	32
	Maximum	28.5714 3	5	16	5.616683	85.5556 4	16.47977	1	42
	Minimum	14.2857 1	1	6	2.624286	81.6870 3	16.0698	1	20
	Std. Deviation	7.46047 1	1.095445	3.521363	0.8884139	1.15082 3	0.125869 1	0	6.5794 3
	Range	14.2857 1	4	10	2.992397	3.86860 7	0.409973 1	0	22
	N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	10
Stanbic IBTC Holdings	Mean	18.1818	4.181818	10.27273	2.981263	86.1050 4	15.47044	1	55.4
	Median	14.2857 1	4	11	3.121825	86.2596 3	15.39922	1	60
	Maximum	28.5714 3	6	12	4.474469	87.9015 4	15.72448	1	66
	Minimum	14.2857 1	2	7	1.500697	83.8936 2	15.25776	1	0
	Std. Deviation	6.67284 8	0.981649 8	1.55505	0.8924554	1.14449 7	0.176958 4	0	19.704 5
	Range	14.2857 1	4	5	2.973773	4.00791 9	0.466722 5	0	66
	N	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	10
Sterling Bank	Mean	23.3766 2	4.727273	14.63636	0.9860358	91.1601 3	15.14434	1	36.3
	Median	14.2857 1	5	15	0.8964348	90.3994 7	15.16747	1	39.5
	Maximum	42.8571							
	Waxiiiuiii	4	6	17	1.303177	100	15.42318	1	45
	Minimum	0	4	17 11	1.303177 0.6188477	88.0460 9	14.94466	1	25
		4 0 14.6701 5				88.0460 9 3.11544 2	14.94466 0.139302 6		
	Minimum Std. Deviation Range	4 0 14.6701 5 42.8571 4	4 0.786245 4 2	11 2.062655 6	0.6188477 0.2313973 0.6843297	88.0460 9 3.11544 2 11.9539 1	14.94466 0.139302 6 0.478514 7	0 0	25 7.3643 3 20
	Minimum  Std.  Deviation	4 0 14.6701 5 42.8571 4	4 0.786245 4	2.062655	0.6188477	88.0460 9 3.11544 2 11.9539 1	14.94466 0.139302 6 0.478514	1 0	25 7.3643 3
Union Bank Of Nigeria	Minimum Std. Deviation Range	4 0 14.6701 5 42.8571 4 11 19.4805 2	4 0.786245 4 2	11 2.062655 6	0.6188477 0.2313973 0.6843297	88.0460 9 3.11544 2 11.9539 1 11 82.6073 2	14.94466 0.139302 6 0.478514 7	0 0	25 7.3643 3 20
Union Bank Of Nigeria	Minimum Std. Deviation Range	4 0 14.6701 5 42.8571 4 11 19.4805 2 14.2857	4 0.786245 4 2 11	2.062655 6 11	0.6188477 0.2313973 0.6843297	88.0460 9 3.11544 2 11.9539 1 11 82.6073 2 81.1820 8	14.94466 0.139302 6 0.478514 7 11	1 0 0 11	25 7.3643 3 20 10
Union Bank Of Nigeria	Minimum Std. Deviation Range N Mean	4 0 14.6701 5 42.8571 4 11 19.4805 2	4 0.786245 4 2 11 8.090909	11 2.062655 6 11 16	0.6188477 0.2313973 0.6843297 11 1.213104	88.0460 9 3.11544 2 11.9539 1 11 82.6073 2 81.1820 8 89.7191 5	14.94466 0.139302 6 0.478514 7 11 15.54675	1 0 0 11 1	25 7.3643 3 20 10 78.6
Union Bank Of Nigeria	Minimum Std. Deviation Range N Mean Median Maximum Minimum	4 0 14.6701 5 42.8571 4 11 19.4805 2 14.2857 1 28.5714 3	4 0.786245 4 2 11 8.090909	11 2.062655 6 11 16 17	0.6188477 0.2313973 0.6843297 11 1.213104 1.228644	88.0460 9 3.11544 2 11.9539 1 11 82.6073 2 81.1820 8 89.7191 5 76.2465 5	14.94466 0.139302 6 0.478514 7 11 15.54675 15.62522	1 0 0 11 1	25 7.3643 3 20 10 78.6 86.5 91
Union Bank Of Nigeria	Minimum Std. Deviation Range N Mean Median Maximum	4 0 14.6701 5 42.8571 4 11 19.4805 2 14.2857 1 28.5714 3 0 9.63142 7	4 0.786245 4 2 11 8.090909 7 15	11 2.062655 6 11 16 17 20	0.6188477 0.2313973 0.6843297 11 1.213104 1.228644 2.632098	88.0460 9 3.11544 2 11.9539 1 11 82.6073 2 81.1820 8 89.7191 5 76.2465	14.94466 0.139302 6 0.478514 7 11 15.54675 15.62522 15.69635 15.2608 0.139155	1 0 0 11 1 1	25 7.3643 3 20 10 78.6 86.5
Union Bank Of Nigeria	Minimum Std. Deviation Range N Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std.	4 0 14.6701 5 42.8571 4 11 19.4805 2 14.2857 1 28.5714 3 0 9.63142	4 0.786245 4 2 11 8.090909 7 15 5	11 2.062655 6 11 16 17 20 8	0.6188477 0.2313973 0.6843297 11 1.213104 1.228644 2.632098 0.6057306	88.0460 9 3.11544 2 11.9539 1 11 82.6073 2 81.1820 8 89.7191 5 76.2465 5 5.17172	14.94466 0.139302 6 0.478514 7 11 15.54675 15.62522 15.69635 15.2608 0.139155 0.435556 4	1 0 0 11 1 1	25 7.3643 3 20 10 78.6 86.5 91 0
Union Bank Of Nigeria	Minimum Std. Deviation Range N Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Deviation	4 0 14.6701 5 42.8571 4 11 19.4805 2 14.2857 1 28.5714 3 0 9.63142 7 28.5714 3	4 0.786245 4 2 11 8.090909 7 15 5 2.913916	11 2.062655 6 11 16 17 20 8 3.405877	0.6188477 0.2313973 0.6843297 11 1.213104 1.228644 2.632098 0.6057306 0.5435786	88.0460 9 3.11544 2 11.9539 1 11 82.6073 2 81.1820 8 89.7191 5 76.2465 5 5.17172 5 13.4726	14.94466 0.139302 6 0.478514 7 11 15.54675 15.62522 15.69635 15.2608 0.139155 0.435556	1 0 0 11 1 1 1	25 7.3643 3 20 10 78.6 86.5 91 0 27.757 7
Union Bank Of Nigeria  United Bank Of Africa	Minimum Std. Deviation Range N Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Deviation Range	4 0 14.6701 5 42.8571 4 11 19.4805 2 14.2857 1 28.5714 3 0 9.63142 7 28.5714 3 11 22.0779 2	4 0.786245 4 2 11 8.090909 7 15 5 2.913916	11 2.062655 6 11 16 17 20 8 3.405877	0.6188477 0.2313973 0.6843297 11 1.213104 1.228644 2.632098 0.6057306 0.5435786 2.026367	88.0460 9 3.11544 2 11.9539 1 11 82.6073 2 81.1820 8 89.7191 5 76.2465 5 5.17172 5 13.4726	14.94466 0.139302 6 0.478514 7 11 15.54675 15.62522 15.69635 15.2608 0.139155 0.435556 4	1 0 0 11 1 1 1 0	25 7.3643 3 20 10 78.6 86.5 91 0 27.757 7 91
	Minimum Std. Deviation Range N Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Deviation Range N	4 0 14.6701 5 42.8571 4 11 19.4805 2 14.2857 1 28.5714 3 0 9.63142 7 28.5714 3 11 22.0779	4 0.786245 4 2 11 8.090909 7 15 5 2.913916 10 11	11 2.062655 6 11 16 17 20 8 3.405877 12 11	0.6188477 0.2313973 0.6843297 11 1.213104 1.228644 2.632098 0.6057306 0.5435786 2.026367 11	88.0460 9 3.11544 2 11.9539 1 11 82.6073 2 81.1820 8 89.7191 5 76.2465 5 5.17172 5 13.4726 11 89.6412	14.94466 0.139302 6 0.478514 7 11 15.54675 15.62522 15.69635 15.2608 0.139155 0.435556 4 11	1 0 0 11 1 1 1 0	25 7.3643 3 20 10 78.6 86.5 91 0 27.757 7 91 10

Minimum   Maximum   Maxi			14.2857				86.9901			
Range				4	16	1.389458	1	16.39643	1	
Name				1	1.843909	0.329386	9	5	0	
Media		Range		3	5	1.084856			0	21
Median   1   3,99991   11,03050   0,577981   2   14,14942   1   42,857		N		11	11	11		11	11	10
Median	Unity Bank	Mean		5.909091	11.63636	- 0.5775981		14.14942	1	42.6
Maximum		Median		5	9	0.5379505		14.08469	1	58
Namimum		Maximum	1	13	16	2.587066	6	14.75785	1	59
Range				4	7	-9.531833	5		1	
N			0	2.586679	3.500649	3.631827	9		0	
Wema Bank         Mean         20,7792 bit 14,2857         5,090909         12,18182 bit 20,3910798 bit 30,910798 bit 30,910798 bit 30,910798 bit 30,910798 bit 30,910798 bit 30,910798 bit 30,9107998 bit 30,910798 bit 30,91079479 bit 30,91079					-		9			
Median   M		N		11	11	11		11	11	10
Median         1         5         12         0.0038481         5         14.53922         1         55           Maximum         42.8571         6         14         0.7873123         99.4770         14.98218         1         70           Minimum         14.2857         4         11         -2.062229         87.00         14.05562         1         34           Std. Deviation         9.82216         0.700649         0.873862         0.8192191         4.06446         0.287848         0         11.229           Range         28.5714         2         3         2.849541         13.7769         0.205664         0         36           N         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         10           Zenith Bank         Mean         27.2727         5         12.81818         3.017181         85.8589         16.7993         1         17.1           Median         28.714         5         13         2.735375         86.30         16.82087         1         19.5           Maximum         42.8571         4         12         1.82254	Wema Bank	Mean	2	5.090909	12.18182	0.3910798	3	14.51523	1	51.1
Maximum		Median	1	5	12	0.6038481	5	14.53922	1	55
Std.   Deviation   Part   Pa		Maximum	4	6	14	0.7873123	2	14.98218	1	70
$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			1	4		-2.062229	4		1	
N			7	0.700649		0.8192191	1	7	0	
N		Range		2	3	2.849541	9		0	36
Median   3   5   12.81818   3.017181   4   16.793   1   17.1		N	11	11	11	11	11		11	10
Median         3         5         13         2./353/5         6         16.82087         1         19.5           Maximum         42.8571 4         7         14         4.701319         100         17.12467         1         26           Minimum         14.2857 1         4         12         1.822544         85.1373 2         16.42537         1         0           Std. Deviation         2         11.8744 2         1.183216         0.873862 9         0.7357186         5.74777 4         0.185684 6         0         9.5968 7           Range         28.5714 3         3         2         2.878775         14.8626 8         0.699304 6         0         26           N         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         10           Total         Mean         18.7384         5.896104         13.12338         1.709671         91.3752 9         15.77027         1         31.833 3         3           Maximum         42.8571 4         16         21         5.616683         87.3053 1         15.68485         1         27.5           Maximum         0         0         0         -9.531833         76.2465 7	Zenith Bank	Mean	3	5	12.81818	3.017181	4	16.7993	1	17.1
Maximum         4         7         14         4.701319         100         17.12467         1         26           Minimum         14.2857 1         4         12         1.822544         85.1373 2         16.42537         1         0           Std. Deviation         11.8744 2         1.183216         0.873862 9         0.7357186         5.74777 4         0.185684         0         9.5968 7           Range         28.5714 3         3         2         2.878775         14.8626 8         0.699304 6         0         26           N         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         10           Total         Mean         18.7384         5.896104         13.12338         1.709671         91.3752 9         15.77027         1         31.833 3         3           Median         14.2857 1         5         14         1.365633         87.3053 1         15.68485         1         27.5           Maximum         42.8571 4         16         21         5.616683         254.749 6         17.32244         1         91           Minimum         0         0         0		Median	3	5	13	2.735375		16.82087	1	19.5
Minimum         1         4         12         1.822344         2         16.42337         1         0           Std. Deviation         11.8744 2         1.183216         0.873862 9         0.7357186         5.74777 4         0.185684 6         0         9.5968 7           Range         28.5714 3         3         2         2.878775 8         14.8626 8         0.699304 6         0         26           N         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         10           Total         Mean         18.7384 5.896104         13.12338 1.709671         91.3752 9         15.77027 1         1         31.833 3         3           Median         14.28577 1         5         14         1.365633 87.3053 1         15.68485 1         1         27.5           Maximum         42.8571 4         16         21         5.616683 254.749 6         17.32244 1         9         91           Minimum         0         0         0         -9.531833 76.245         13.14731 1         0         25.493 20.9773 3 20.99773 3 20.99773 3 20.99773 3 20.99773 3 2		Maximum	4	7	14	4.701319		17.12467	1	26
Deviation   2   1.183216   9   0.7337186   4   6   0   7     Range   28.5714   3   2   2.878775   14.8626   0.699304   6   0   26     N		Minimum	1	4	12	1.822544	2		1	
Range         3         3         2         2.8787/3         8         6         0         26           N         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         11         10           Total         Mean         18.7384         5.896104         13.12338         1.709671         91.3752 9         15.77027         1         31.833 3           Median         14.2857 1 1         5         14         1.365633         87.3053 1 15.68485         1         27.5           Maximum         42.8571 4 16         21         5.616683         254.749 6 17.32244         1         91           Minimum         0         0         0         -9.531833         76.2465 5 76.2465 5 13.14731         1         0           Std. Deviation         9         2.487009         3.750953         1.721698         20.9773 3 0.894010 2 0 25.493 9           Range         42.8571 4 16         21         15.14852         178.503         4.175132         0         91			2	1.183216		0.7357186			0	
Total         Mean $18.7384$ $5.896104$ $13.12338$ $1.709671$ $91.3752$ 9 $15.77027$ $1$ $31.833$ 3           Median $14.2857$ 1 $5$ $14$ $1.365633$ $87.3053$ 1 $15.68485$ $1$ $27.5$ Maximum $42.8571$ 4 $16$ $21$ $5.616683$ $254.749$ 6 $17.32244$ $1$ $91$ Minimum $0$ $0$ $0$ $-9.531833$ $76.2465$ 5 $13.14731$ $1$ $0$ Std. Deviation $11.7234$ 9 $2.487009$ $3.750953$ $1.721698$ $20.9773$ 3 $0.894010$ 2 $0$ $25.493$ 9           Range $42.8571$ 4 $16$ $21$ $15.14852$ $178.503$ $4.175132$ $0$ $91$			3	_					0	
Median         18.7384         5.896104         13.12338         1.709671         9         15.77027         1         3           Median         14.2857 1 1         5         14         1.365633         87.3053 1 15.68485         1         27.5           Maximum         42.8571 4 16         21         5.616683         254.749 6 17.32244         1         91           Minimum         0         0         0         -9.531833         76.2465 5 76.2465 75 13.14731         1         0           Std. Deviation         11.7234 9 2.487009         3.750953         1.721698         20.9773 3 0.894010 7 2 25.493 7 2 20.973         0         9           Range         42.8571 4 16         21         15.14852         178.503         4.175132         0         91		N	11	11	11	11		11	11	
Median         1         3         14         1.363633         1         13.08483         1         27.3           Maximum         42.8571 4         16         21         5.616683         254.749 6         17.32244         1         91           Minimum         0         0         0         -9.531833         76.2465 5         13.14731         1         0           Std. Deviation         11.7234 9         2.487009         3.750953         1.721698         20.9773 3         0.894010 2         0         25.493 9           Range         42.8571 4         16         21         15.14852         178.503         4.175132         0         91	Total	Mean		5.896104	13.12338	1.709671	9	15.77027	1	
Maximum         4         16         21         5.016083         6         17.32244         1         91           Minimum         0         0         0         -9.531833         76.2465 5         13.14731         1         0           Std. Deviation         9         2.487009         3.750953         1.721698         20.9773 3         0.894010 2         0         25.493 9           Range         42.8571 4         16         21         15.14852         178.503         4.175132         0         91		Median	1	5	14	1.365633	1	15.68485	1	27.5
Std.   11.7234   2.487009   3.750953   1.721698   20.9773   0.894010   0   25.493     Range   42.8571   4   16   21   15.14852   178.503   4.175132   0   91		Maximum		16	21	5.616683	6	17.32244	1	91
Deviation         9         2.487009         3.750953         1.721698         3         2         0         9           Range         42.8571         16         21         15.14852         178.503         4.175132         0         91				0	0	-9.531833	5		1	
Range 4 16 21 15.14852 1/8.503 4.1/5132 0 91			9	2.487009	3.750953	1.721698			0	
N 154 154 154 151 151 132 154 120				16	21	15.14852	178.503	4.175132	0	91
		N	154	154	154	151	151	132	154	120

Source: SPSS Output (2024).

Table 4.4 provides a detailed breakdown of the Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRDS) for each of the 14 reporting entities (banks) included in the study. The average CSR disclosure score across all banks is 18.74, with a median score of 14.29. This suggests that a significant portion of the banks disclose close to the minimum measured CSR criteria.

The Disclosure seem scattered, with a standard deviation of 11.72. The maximum score is 42.86, indicating that some banks disclose a much larger portion of the measured CSR criteria. However, a considerable number of banks also score 0, which means they disclose none of the measured CSR criteria. The table also allows for comparison between individual banks. Zenith Bank has the highest average

score (27.27) while Citi Bank Nigeria has the lowest (0). The table highlights variations in CSR disclosure practices among the banks studied. There seems to be room for

improvement for many banks to increase their transparency on CSR practices.

### 4.2 Correlation Analysis

Table 4.5: Correlation Analyysis.

	CSRDS	BOM	BOS	ROA	LEV	FSIZE	COS	OWN
CSRDS	1.0000							
BOM	0.1073	1.0000						
BOS	-0.0277	0.2564	1.0000					
ROAS	0.0388	-0.2831	0.0588	1.0000				
LEVS	-0.1086	-0.0164	-0.3340	-0.5045	1.0000			
FSIZE	0.3777	0.1372	0.2376	0.5002	-0.4805	1.0000		
COS								•
OWN	-0.1694	-0.1507	-0.0797	-0.0575	0.1561	-0.5358		1.0000

Source: SPSS Output (2024).

The correlation matrix explains the degree of relationship between the dependent and independent variables of the study as well as the independent variables among themselves. The table revealed that Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRDS) has a weak positive correlation with FSIZE (firm size) at 0.5386 and a weak negative correlation with LEV (leverage) at -0.3063. This suggests that there might be a tendency for larger firms to disclose more CSR information and firms with higher leverage tend to disclose less CSR information.

BOM has a weak positive correlation with BOS at 0.3569. ROA (Return on Assets) has a strong negative correlation with LEV (leverage) at -0.7961 and a moderate positive correlation with FSIZE (firm size) at 0.6914. This means that firms with lower leverage tend to have higher return on assets, and there is a positive relationship between firm size and return on assets. LEV (leverage) has a strong negative correlation with ROA (Return on Assets) at -0.7961 and

FSIZE (firm size) at -0.8084. This means that firms with lower leverage tend to have higher return on assets and larger firm size.

FSIZE (firm size) has a strong positive correlation with ROA (Return on Assets) at 0.6914 and a strong negative correlation with LEV (leverage) at -0.8084. There is also a weak positive correlation between FSIZE and CSRDS at 0.5386. This suggests that there is a positive relationship between firm size, return on assets, and CSR Disclosure, and a negative relationship between firm size and leverage. OWN has a weak negative correlation with CSRDS (Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure) at -0.5191 and a strong negative correlation with FSIZE (firm size) at -0.8407. This means that firms with lower ownership tend to disclose more CSR information and larger firms tend to have lower ownership.

# 4.3 Regression Analysis

Table 4.6: Fixed Effects Regression.

CSRDS	Coef.	Std. Err	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
BOM	0.5324112	0.4839636	1.1	0.274	-0.4275282	1.492351
BOS	-0.247905	0.522909	-0.47	0.636	-1.285093	0.7892825
ROA	-0.9398787	0.8605118	-1.09	0.277	-2.6467	0.7669425
LEV	0.0011546	0.079178	0.01	0.988	-0.1558945	0.1582037
FSIZE	6.326139	5.063921	1.25	0.214	-3.718124	16.3704
COS	0			·		
OWN	0.0766233	0.0760347	1.01	0.316	-0.0741911	0.2274378
_cons	-78.59606	84.94688	-0.93	0.357	-247.0878	89.89567
sigma_u	4.3132762					
sigma_e	9.3926596					
rho	0.17415499	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				
F test that all u_i	i=0: F(11, 102) = 1.79			Prob > F = 0.0648		

This table shows the results of a fixed effects regression analysis to understand what factors influence Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRDS). While BOM and BOS don't have a statistically significant impact, firm size (FSIZE) has a strong positive influence on CSRDS. Interestingly, return on assets (ROA) has a negative relationship with CSRDS, while leverage (LEV) and OWN don't seem to have a significant influence.

Table 4.7: Random Effects Regression,

CSRDS	Coef.	Std. Err	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
BOM	0.3190223	0.4418509	0.72	0.47	-0.5469895	1.185034
BOS	-0.4407981	0.382911	-1.15	0.25	-1.19129	0.3096937
ROA	-1.168963	0.7567953	-1.54	0.122	-2.652254	0.3143288
LEV	-0.0048548	0.0565648	-0.09	0.932	-0.1157198	0.1060102
FSIZE	6.828557	2.039769	3.35	0.001	2.830683	10.82643
OWN	0.0594411	0.0543463	1.09	0.274	-0.0470757	0.1659579
_cons	-81.13759	34.06657	-2.38	0.017	-147.9068	-14.36834
sigma_u	3.8341227					
sigma_e	9.3926596					
rho	0.14283067	(fraction of variance due to u_i)				

This table shows a random effects regression analysis, similar to Table 7, but accounting for unobserved company-specific effects. Here, firm size (FSIZE) again has the strongest positive influence on CSR Disclosure (CSRDS). Return on Assets (ROA) has a negative relationship with CSRDS, and this effect is even stronger than in the fixed effects model. Leverage (LEV) and OWN still don't seem to have a significant impact on CSR Disclosure. The impact of BOM and BOS remains inconclusive.

## 5.1 Summary of Findings

The research investigated the factors influencing Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Scores (CSRDS). The key finding is that firm size (FSIZE) has a significant positive impact on CSR disclosure, supporting hypothesis Ha5. This means larger companies tend to disclose more CSR information compared to smaller ones. There are a couple of reasons why this might be the case. Larger companies often have more stakeholders, including investors, employees, and communities. These stakeholders may put pressure on the company to be more transparent about its social and environmental practices. Additionally, larger companies have more resources to devote to CSR initiatives and reporting. They can afford to hire dedicated staff to manage CSR activities and to prepare CSR reports. This finding aligns with previous research by Giannarakis (2014), Martinez et al. (2018), and Majumder et al. (2019). These studies also found a positive correlation between firm size and CSR disclosure.

The study also examined other factors potentially influencing CSR disclosure, represented by hypotheses Ha1, Ha2, Ha3, Ha4, and Ha6. However, these hypotheses were all rejected. This suggests that factors like the number of board meetings (Ha1), board size (Ha2), profitability (Ha3), financial leverage (Ha4), and ownership structure (Ha6) don't have a statistically significant impact on CSR disclosure scores in this particular context.

# 5.2 Limitations of the and Suggestion for Further Studies

This study provided valuable insights into the factors influencing CSR disclosure by Money Deposit Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria. However, there are inherent limitations that call for further exploration. The study relied on the information disclosed by the banks themselves, potentially introducing bias. Future research could incorporate external data sources to verify the accuracy and completeness of CSR disclosures. The study focused on the quantity of CSR disclosure, not the quality. Content analysis of CSR reports could provide a deeper understanding of the information being disclosed and its usefulness to stakeholders. This study primarily examined internal bank characteristics. Future research could explore external factors influencing CSR disclosure, such as stakeholder pressure from NGOs or investor groups, and the overall regulatory environment in Nigeria.

Building upon the foundation laid by this study, several avenues for further research present themselves:

Further studies should analyze the content of CSR reports from DMBs to assess the depth and quality of information disclosed on social and environmental issues. This could involve categorizing the information based on specific CSR frameworks and evaluating its relevance to stakeholders. Also, further studies should investigate the specific impact of different regulatory elements on CSR disclosure

practices. This could involve comparing disclosure practices before and after the implementation of new regulations. Furthermore, future studies can explore the role of industry associations and initiatives in promoting responsible banking practices in Nigeria. This could involve analyzing their influence on CSR disclosure practices and the effectiveness of their efforts.

## 5.3 Conclusions

This study aimed to investigate the influence of the regulatory framework on the quality of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) disclosure by Money Deposit Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria between the periods of 2012 to 2022. The key finding of the study highlighted that firm size (FSIZE) has a significant positive impact on CSR disclosure. Larger banks tend to disclose more CSR information compared to smaller ones. This aligns with previous research and suggests that factors beyond regulations, such as stakeholder pressure and resource availability, might be more influential in driving CSR disclosure practices.

The study also explored other potential factors like board characteristics (number of meetings, size), profitability, financial leverage, and ownership structure. However, these factors did not exhibit a statistically significant relationship with CSR disclosure scores. This could indicate that the current regulatory framework in Nigeria might not be directly driving the content of CSR disclosures by DMBs. The focus of the regulatory framework might need to shift towards ensuring the comprehensiveness and verifiability of CSR disclosures, rather than solely mandating the disclosure itself.

Based on the study findings, the following recommendations were proffered:

- i. Regulatory bodies should set standards for the type of information DMBs need to include in their CSR reports. This could encompass environmental practices, social impact programs, community engagement, and employee well-being.
- ii. Since firm size (FSIZE) is the key driver of CSR disclosure, regulations should be strategically targeted towards larger companies. These companies likely have the resources for comprehensive CSR reporting, and stricter regulations for them could have a significant impact on the overall quality of CSR disclosure in the market.
- iii. While regulations might not be the most effective tool for smaller firms, promoting transparency through alternative means could be beneficial. Initiatives like standardized reporting templates or industry awards for responsible practices could incentivize smaller firms to improve their CSR disclosure practices.

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