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The Efficacy of Non-Kinetic Measures in Mitigating Insecurity in Nigeria.

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Abstract

Nigeria's persistent insecurity, fueled by Boko Haram, banditry, and ethnic violence, necessitates a holistic approach beyond traditional kinetic measures. This study examines non-kinetic strategies to tackle insecurity in Nigeria, focusing on socioeconomic, political, and cultural interventions. Findings reveal that non-kinetic approaches can significantly mitigate insecurity by addressing root causes, promoting social cohesion, and fostering inclusive governance. Through empirical analysis and stakeholder insights, this research demonstrates the potential of non-kinetic approaches to reduce violence, promote stability, and foster resilient communities in Nigeria. Nigeria may minimize violence, create peace, and stimulate development by investigating and resolving the core causes of insecurity through nonviolent ways. This study contends that a comprehensive approach that combines kinetic and non-kinetic tactics will produce more effective and long-term results in resolving Nigeria's security concerns. The study recommends a multifaceted strategy integrating these approaches with kinetic measures to achieve sustainable peace and security in Nigeria.

Keywords: Non-kinetic approaches, insecurity, Nigeria, socioeconomic development, Boko Haram, community engagement, cultural revitalization.

Introduction

Nigeria's security difficulties continue, jeopardizing the country's corporate existence. While some of these difficulties predate the establishment of modern Nigeria, many more have evolved in recent years, aggravating the country's conflict situation. Many sorts of insecurity today are directly related to financial and political inequalities, while others stem from ethno-religious conflicts, perceived marginalization, and actual and perceived injustice. As a result, multiple factors have compounded the intractable nature of security issues. The epidemic of insecurity and threats to people's lives and property in Nigeria has clearly reached a tipping point. This is despite the Nigerian military and other security agencies' increased exposure and combat operations in dealing with internal crises.

These distressing episodes appear to have prompted the people to question the government's commitment and tactics for resolving the long-running security situation. Many stakeholders and security specialists have suggested a "soft or non-kinetic strategy" to address the country's current security concerns. The non-kinetic strategy refers to the use of non-lethal methods to combat terrorism. This has become increasingly important given the country's various security challenges. The military has taken a number of initiatives to gain the trust of citizens in crisis zones, but there is still work to be done given the level of skepticism surrounding the military.

To make a significant difference in the lives of Nigerians, the military must go beyond organizing meetings and medical missions. The rebel struggle has displaced a considerable number of people in the northeast. Many of these people continue to live in refugee camps located across the combat zone. They can't return to their ancestral homes because everything has been destroyed.

In Afghanistan, the Americans made numerous efforts to create trust and confidence in the population. According to Paula Broadway's book "All in the Education of General David Petraeus," Americans have rebuilt mosques and communities, established local police to help defend the hamlet from Taliban raids, lived among the people, and participated in local

events.

Nigeria's military lacks the resources to undertake large-scale operations. As a result, they must acquire the political class's support in order to adequately fund programs that will allow them to regain the public's trust and confidence. According to the vanguard daily, Lieutenant General Tukur Buratai, the former army staff commander, outlined a plan he dubbed the "non-kinetic approach" in 2018, but more work is needed to win over more people to the military's cause.

The Borno state administration and army's efforts to ensure that more people return to their ancestral lands must be backed up by a solid plan to ensure that armed forces live alongside the people. One of the reasons Boko Haram may display flags, levy taxes, and roam freely in some areas is a lack of security presence. According to Gen. Lucky Irabor, Chief of Defence Staff, adopting a non-kinetic approach to security problems, together with other measures, has significantly boosted the success of current operations by the country's armed forces.

He went on to say, "One of the benefits of non-kinetic military operations is that they can be used to achieve strategic objectives without causing unnecessary damage or loss of life, which is especially important in conflicts where civilian casualties must be minimized" (<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/04/insecurity-how-adoption-of-non-kinetic-approach-aided-armed-forces-irabor/>) (Kingsley Omonobi).

On Monday, General Christopher Musa, Chief of Defence Staff, revealed that the Nigerian Armed Forces used a non-kinetic approach in the struggle against insurgency after understanding that winning the war using kinetic methods had become untenable.

Musa emphasized the need of interagency coordination, psychological operations, and strategic communication in reducing insurgency. Resistance groups use asymmetric warfare, which combines conventional, irregular, terrorist, and counter-insurgency tactics to provide forces or prevent economic intimidation in countries.

Major General Emmanuel Undiandeye, Chief of Defence Intelligence, emphasized the importance of psychological operations in the battle against insurgency. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Safe Neighbourhoods Initiative worked together to organize a five-day training session in psychological operations and strategic communications.

Conceptual clarifications

Understanding some of the underlying concepts is necessary in this type of conversation. There are three distinct approaches: insurgent, kinetic, and non-kinetic.

Insurgency is a well-known phrase that scholars have explored from numerous angles. In this paper, we propose that an insurgency is a well-organized movement with the lofty goal of weakening or destroying the incumbent overnment, rendering it incapable of controlling the territory. Boko Haram, a deadly rebel group in Nigeria, is also categorized as a terrorist organization.

A kinetic approach is a significant progressive and aggressive military action that includes active warfare as well as the use of physical and material means such as bombs, bullets, rockets, and other munitions against enemies or adversaries in order to neutralize, capture, or eliminate them. The federal government of Nigeria,

through the Nigerian armed forces, has launched and continues to conduct kinetic attacks on top Boko Haram terrorist leaders and commanders.

The non-kinetic approach is a non-military strategy that involves the use of non-military and other capabilities against a potential enemy, such as the use of nonlethal strategies (such as civil-military operations, engagement, negotiation, information support operations, psychological operations, and rehabilitation), and tactics with "sub-lethal" or "weapons not intended to be lethal" weapons (Ducheine, 2014).

Understanding the Nigerian government's non-kinetic response to the Boko Haram insurgency the Northeast, 2011–2015. After the Federal Government's kinetic approach failed to effectively confront the atrocities of the Boko Haram insurgency, it was obliged to embrace a nonviolent strategy. The government used both kinetic and non-kinetic measures in its counterinsurgency war against Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria. Counter-insurgency efforts now use both kinetic and non-kinetic techniques. The non-kinetic strategy can be traced back to the ancient Chinese scholar Sun Tzu, who contended that direct tactics were used to join war and indirect ones to win. T.E. Lawrence and strategist Lindell Hart had similar views throughout the twentieth century, and the substance of their views is reflected in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review:

To win in (irregular warfare), the United States must frequently employ an indirect strategy, depending on and cooperating with others. The indirect tactic entails unbalancing foes physically and psychologically rather than striking them where they are strongest or in the way they expect to be attacked (Brimley & Singh, 2008).

Because of the effectiveness of this non-military technique in other countries, such as Pakistan, Nigeria's administration, led by Jonathan, used it in its counter-insurgency operations in the Northeast. Between 2011–2015, the government conducted a variety of non-kinetic measures to combat the Boko Haram's insurgency in the northeast. Attempts will be made to identify and assess each non-kinetic activity begun by Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria's previous president. During the tenure of former President Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria's federal government launched its first non-kinetic endeavor to put an end to the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast. As the BHTs' terror campaign in the North-East intensified, the Federal Government, led by Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, formed a seven-member In 2011, a Presidential Committee was formed to address security challenges in Nigeria's north-east zone. Ambassador Usman Gaji Galtimari chaired the committee, which presented its findings to the Federal Government (also known as the Galtimari group findings) in September 2011.

In its May 2012 White Paper, the Federal Government accepted the Galtimari Committee's recommendation to engage, negotiate, and dialogue with the sect's leadership, subject to the cessation of all forms of violence, including the surrender of weaponry, followed by liberation. The committee's report was studied but not immediately accepted. The BHTs continued to conduct violent attacks, the Federal administration came under increasing local and international pressure to find a long-term solution to the brewing crisis.

This led to support for the Dialogue Option, prompting the

formation of a new committee, the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North met on April 16, 2013. The committee, led by Taminu Turaki, Minister of Special Duties, was charged.

"Identifying and constructively engaging key members of the Boko Haram sect" and developing a "comprehensive and workable framework for resolving the crisis of insecurity in the northern part of the country" (Adewumi, 2014; Adesote & Ajayi, 2021).

The group was also tasked with developing a thorough victim support program as well as a strategy for addressing the underlying causes of the insurgency in order to prevent future instances. The panel was also tasked to develop a framework for amnesty and disarmament of Boko Haram members (The News, March 24, 2014, p. 17).

This development undoubtedly made it impossible for the committee will identify the alleged 'faceless organization', bring its members to the negotiating table, and provide a realistic long-term resolution plan. This is supported by the Chairman of the Committee's argument, who stated that the committee was active prior to the declaration of the state of emergency its negotiations, but since then, the conversation has been less frequent (Adesote and Ajayi, 2021). The discussion committee also faced the challenge of not having the authority to negotiate on behalf of the administration.

Before falling asleep, the Committee allegedly met with select sect members, including its spiritual leader, Abubakar Shekau, and reported to the FG on its findings. It was also revealed that during the Committee's conversations with rebel group leaders, some BHT commanders agreed to amnesty while others denied (The News, March 24, 2014, pp. 17; Adewumi, 2014). It was stated that this contributed to the formation of the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP), led by Abu Abdullah Ibn Umar Albarnawi. Despite media claims that the Committee released its report on November 13, 2013, the recommendations were not made public. According to speculations, one of the body's primary suggestions was for the government to "establish a standing committee for continuous interaction" with the insurgents. In March 2014, committee members at numerous forums stated that the administration 'had not acted on any of its recommendations'. Some have even stated that the FG ignored important remarks on specific concerns (Adewumi 2014). In the end, the attempt failed to meet its objectives.

Despite the initiative's failure, the Federal Government (FG), led by Dr. Goodluck Jonathan, went a step further in 2013 by establishing a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) department within the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), dubbed National Security Corridor, to battle Boko Haram recruiting and mobilization while also rehabilitating defectors. The new agency's goal is to address the core causes of recruitment into Boko Haram and establish a procedure for rehabilitating group defectors (Onapajo and Ozden, 2020). Fatima Akilu, a Nigerian Muslim psychologist and former Director of Behavioural Analysis and Strategic Communication at the ONSA, led the group.

Akilu assisted the FG in designing the Countering Violent Extremism Programme, which ran from 2013 to 2015. The CVE program was multidisciplinary initiative that provided former Boko Haram members, young people, and other

vulnerable groups with viable alternatives to violent extremism. The CVE contained a deradicalization section that the focus was on the nexus between community development and security, with the goal of rehabilitating former extremists through workforce training, psychiatric therapy, faith-based treatments, and healthcare. According to Felbab-Brown (2018), the CVE divided Boko Haram defectors into three risk categories: low, medium, and high. The first two categories were subjected to disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs, while high-risk defectors faced prosecution. In 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari established a new democratic administration, and the CVE, led by Fatima Akilu, ceased functioning

oversee deradicalization initiatives. It is worth noting that during CVE's existence, the program was said to have had little impact, notably in terms of the number of remorseful BHTs who have joined. In her first report to the new administration, the program's director stated that 22 women and girls were undergoing rehabilitation after voluntarily surrendering to the program, that 305 terrorist group victims had been successfully rehabilitated, and that 47 former militants had joined the program (Onapajo and Ozden, 2020).

Security of Insecurity Challenges in Nigeria

In this age of intelligence, security is a social magnet that is both scientific and neoscientific. According to AlBayaa (2011), security in the twenty-first century necessitates collaboration and the collection of intelligence threat collection and management in order to adopt new methodologies and strategy kinetic and non-kinetic responses to security wars through conventional and unconventional means. Security currently requires a comprehensive and multifaceted response to crucial, sensitive, and dynamic global security concerns. This requires an urgent and ongoing security and safety evaluation (Pierce, Cleary, Holland, & Rabrenovic 2018).

To address Nigeria's 21st-century national security issues and aspirations, citizen security experts and security personnel must work together. Every country's security is vital, and scientific techniques and technology are inextricably linked, providing solutions to national security issues.

Security is a top priority for everyone because it is essential to the existence of all cultures. Addressing the security dilemma necessitates both kinetic and non-kinetic tactics, such as a traditional and grand plan, or an alternative security strategy that represents the future of modern national security. Grand strategy is the foundation of conventional strategy since a successful military action requires preparation and logistics. The physical health of security forces has a considerable impact on their effectiveness and how men respond to training and command. The overarching economic plan addresses these difficulties. The strategy effectively develops and coordinates the use of political, economic, and military force to protect national interests and objectives in all circumstances.

Insecurity in Nigeria diversified, and the country is experiencing fast insecurity as a result of a variety of threats such as terrorism, kidnapping, banditry, conspiracy, and other external and internal security concerns. Threats and insecurity challenges can arise at any level, including

global, regional, national, and local, and they are typically mutually reinforcing. In international policy, national security, and domestic politics. We need to chart a new path. Recent events have revealed that many of our most important concerns do not respect borders or malls and must be addressed jointly. Insecurity, pandemics, and other biological risks, the escalating climate crisis, cyber and digital threats, international economic disruption, a long-running humanitarian response crisis, violent extremism and terrorism, and the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are all major concerns. Existential threats to security concerns may develop in certain circumstances. Olaniyonu (2022) advocates combating the threat of instability by tackling youth dissatisfaction, unemployment, starvation, despair, and a plot.

These components of national life will continue to face significant threats from security issues. Fuel, along with severe storms and attacks, is fuelling insecurity in Nigeria. To develop effective measures to dealing with social instability, stakeholders, individuals, security professionals, and security personnel must all participate and collaborate. The government, especially the executive branch, should be strengthened to detect security faults and gaps and respond to national security concerns.

Insecurity in Nigeria

Insecurity is just a lack of security. Security is considered as a dynamic scenario in which the State/Country is able to protect its deeply embedded beliefs and interests against threats.

Insecurity of lives and properties is the fundamental reason for the existence of a government in the first place as attested by the various social contract theorists. Prevention of aggression to the individual both from within and without and securing for him the leverage to optimize his potentialities towards economic and social development is part of the content of security. Security entails the absence of threats to peace, stability, national cohesion and integration, and the political and socio-economic objectives of a nation. Therefore, insecurity must mean the absence. Insecurity is simply the absence of security. Security is considered a dynamic situation that includes the capacity of the State/Country to ward off any threats to its deep-rooted values and interests. Security of lives and properties is the fundamental reason for the existence of a government in the first place as attested by the various social contract theorists. Prevention of aggression to the individual both from within and without and securing for him the leverage to optimize his potentialities towards economic and social development is part of the content of security. Security entails the absence of threats to peace, stability, national cohesion and integration, and the political and socio-economic objectives of a nation. Therefore, insecurity must mean the absence. Insecurity is just a lack of security. Security is defined as a dynamic situation in which a state or country can protect its core principles and interests (Omede, 2012). Several social contract theorists believe that the primary goal of government is to protect people's lives and property. Security includes the prevention of violence against the individual from within and without, as well as the supply of leverage to maximize his economic and social potential. Security is described as the absence of threats to peace, stability, national cohesion, and integration, as well as a country's political and economic

objectives (Ozigbo 2019) As a result, insecurity must suggest the absence of safety or the existence of risk; hazard; uncertainty; lack of confidence; questionable; inadequately guarded or protected; instability; trouble; a lack of protection; and hazardous (Ozoigbo, 2019). Insecurity can lead to lack of confidence, dread, anxiety, oppression, loss of focus, heartbreak, and humanity (Ozoigbo, 2019). Insecurity implies anarchy, yet Thomas Hobbes says that human life becomes nasty, brutish, and short' (Hobbes 1965).

The southwest of Nigeria is seeing an upsurge in cybercrime, armed robbery, kidnapping, domestic violence, extrajudicial killings, herder-farmer conflicts, ritual killings, and banditry. The southeast is plagued by ritual killings, commercial crime, secessionist agitation, kidnapping, herder-farmer conflicts, mysterious shooter attacks, and banditry. Militancy, kidnapping, and environmental activism remain significant challenges in the south-south. For more than a decade, Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa Province

have caused a humanitarian disaster in the northeast. Meanwhile, the northwest is beset by illegal mining, ethno-religious conflict, and banditry. As a result, insecurity in Nigeria has adopted a soft political attitude, killing hundreds of people and causing massive damage and loss of property. According to the Institute of Economics and Peace's 2021 global peace index, Nigeria ranks 146th out of 163 nations with a score of 2.712, and 39th out of 44 Sub-Saharan African countries. This has led to dread and a lack of trust in Nigeria's security architecture. As a result, in recent years, various foreign governments have issued travel advisories to people planning to visit Nigeria due to the country's level of instability.

Kinetic and Non-Kinematic Approaches to insecurity in Nigeria

The level of insecurity and threat to Nigerian lives and property has reached an alarming high. This is despite the Nigerian military's expanded exposure and combat participation in domestic security management. This disturbing trend appears to have fueled widespread criticism of governments' involvement and efforts to address the current insecurity situation. Many stakeholders and security experts believe that a soft or non-kinetic approach could help address the country's current security challenges (Madobi, 2021). When implementing this plan, it is critical to recognize the importance Traditional and religious institutions have important roles in conflict resolution and prevention, as well as maintaining peace and security.

The Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) produced Nigeria's National Security Strategy (NNSS), which emphasizes the significance of a well-known organization in security management. This technique will be implemented vertically through the federal, state, and municipal governments, as well as horizontally through Civil society, academics, traditional, religious, and community leaders. Special emphasis has been placed on employment creation, poverty reduction, and economic development. The nonkinetic method is critical for national cohesiveness and stability. They play an important role in protecting our cultures, traditions, values, morality, and beliefs. According to Ezeobi (2022), combining kinetic and non-kinetic approaches of fighting banditry improves

operational engagement.

Kinetic and non-kinetic acts reduce uncertainty while promoting national stability. Non-kinetic operations employ non-lethal strategies and tactics utilizing sub-lethal or non-lethal weaponry (Ezeobi, 2022). Operations are acts in which security personnel are not required to perform combat tasks. Non-kinetic operations include infrastructure development, economic boost, and humanitarian aid. The kinetic method to eliminating or reducing the threat posed by rebels, bandits, kidnappers, and criminal elements. In contrast to the hold-and-build phases, which establish and maintain an adequate level of security while working with civilian leaders to support the development of critical institutions and regional capacities, kinetic operations can range from a full-scale invasion to assisting a country in rebuilding schools and homes.

Thus, non-kinetic warfare is defined by the goal of the physical activity. Similarly, public intentions have a direct impact on the result of the disagreement. This introduces another critical component of non-kinetic warfare: population. Non-kinetic activities enhance the long-term prospects for economic, social, and political stability. This method is vital for the country's security policy for winning conflicts and eliminating instability. To summarize, both kinetic and non-kinetic competitive strategies are shifting and will likely alter during the next decade (Madobi, 2021). Kinetic military action comprises actual combat and lethal force. The concept distinguishes between conventional military might and soft power, which includes diplomacy, sanctions, and cyber warfare. Kinetic targeting is the use of military force to discharge or focus kinetic energy on opposing forces or objects the goal of generating lethal physical effects. Nigeria's military has been combating non-state groups and terrorists for the past decade. Since 2009, the AFN has conducted a number of military operations and drills throughout the country to address and combat the country's security challenges.

The Coalition of Northern Groups (CNG) has called on northern governors to employ nonviolent ways to address the region's mounting security issues. The Coalition's Katsina State Coordinator, Habibu Ruma, told journalists in Katsina on Sunday that the region's security situation necessitated an urgent non-kinetic plan including community members.

He stated that numerous northern governors' efforts to tackle terrorism and other security challenges in their states have proven ineffective, given the region's recent wave of terrorist attacks and casualties. Ruma lamented the country's insufficient number of "overstretched" security officers, claiming that their arsenal and well-being are in shambles as terrorists' arsenals expand, with more young Nigerians recruited as informants or field agents.

He did, however, mention civil-military coordination, psychological and diplomatic community participation, and social and economic support as non-kinetic approaches that regional governors should use to resolve security challenges. He went on to say that state governments should establish a significant poverty alleviation program in rural areas, with a focus on young people, to address youth restiveness, which he described as one of the monsters of insecurity.

Ruma urged the government to empower the community to take responsibility for the security situation, eradicate ungoverned areas, address porous borders, minimize

corruption, and promote Nigerian unity. He cited illiteracy, ignorance, marginalization, bad leadership, religious intolerance, and drug misuse as primary causes of instability in the state, particularly in the north. To combat the epidemic, he proposed that the government establish and implement a rigorous literacy program in the state, as well as merge Christian and Western education to instill moral values in society, "because the majority of individuals involved in banditry lack formal education".

He said: "It is time for the relevant authorities to investigate the viability of a non-kinetic approach to dealing with the deteriorating security situation in the state and the northern area." Shinkafi of Zamfara State attested to the deployment of a non-kinetic strategy centered on diplomatic community interaction, which produced astounding outcomes.

He emphasized that the non-kinetic approach must be coordinated across the region, with substantial engagement from the Federal Government, to prevent authorities from sending contradictory signals to criminals. Non-kinetic attacks, unlike traditional kinetic warfare, can be carried out anonymously or under the appearance of an opposing force. This makes it difficult to discern the proper response and may lead to conflict escalation.

Senator Kashim Shettima, the Vice President, declared on Saturday that both kinetic and non-kinetic techniques should be taken to address the country's myriad security challenges. He made the remarks during the graduation ceremony for the National Institute for Security Studies' Executive Intelligence Management Course 16 in Abuja. Shettima stated that the agitation of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South-East, banditry in the North-Central, and terrorism in the North-East and North-West necessitate both violent and nonviolent measures. The Vice President blamed the current instability in certain sections of the country on poverty and unemployment, emphasizing the need for improved management.

Conclusion

Nigeria's current state of insecurity is awful and pitiful. The country has experienced an unprecedented spike in insecurity caused by warlords seeking instability, posing the threat of violent extremism, peasant-pastoral conflict, banditry, kidnapping, murder, sectarianism, corruption, injustice, poverty, and other security issues.

The article looked at the OPSC's non-kinetic approach and disaster risk reduction strategy. The country's decision to pursue a non-kinetic strategy appears to be a sound strategic move forward. They provide both opportunities and challenges. The program's goal would be undermined if there was a perception problem in society, i.e., if the DRR program was viewed as a reward for criminal action or as the principal priority of ex-combatants. As a result, this choice is considered as a significant error on the part of the government, which failed to provide appropriate information about the OPSC project to the general public, civil society, and community leaders.

One could wonder why, if the government is doing the right thing and victims of insurgency assaults remain in IDP camps, there are still refugees in Niger. The transitional justice system has flaws, particularly for those who have undergone significant trauma. The Restoration Justice System should have been considered because people's farms, grain storage facilities, and livestock were destroyed, thousands of people died, and around 93 Chibok

girls have been missing for more than 9 years.

Banditry, an offshoot of Boko Haram, is widespread in the country, some traditional rulers have been toppled, the ruling structure has been dispersed or destabilized, and many people remain in IDP camps, as previously said; instead, terrorists have been exposed to a variety of professional skill training. However, the new initiative project, OPSC/DRR, has the potential to be successful in the near term. To a large extent, it has; yet, the role of OPSC in changing the insurgency in Nigeria's northeast cannot be overstated.

It is a counter-insurgency strategy that combines 70% non-kinetic warfare with 30% kinetic techniques. There is evidence of surrenders, a total of approximately fifteen (15) thousand surrenders, and the DRR process, which has helped to some extent but may not be completely successful because there are still people who believe in Boko Haram's ideology, and banditry is on the rise in the country. Actually, there is evidence of widespread surrender, fewer bombings of soft targets, and a dramatic reduction in Boko Haram recruitment.

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